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Introduction 
Finding a “New Moment” 
In the Gannon Lecture offered by Joseph Cardinal Bernardin on December 6, 1983 at 
Fordham University, the Cardinal provided to his audience an overview of the bishops’ then-
recent pastoral letter regarding nuclear weapons, as well as some reflections as to how the 
development of a “consistent ethic of life” might assist in “[shaping] the American public 
debate” regarding a whole host of policy issues.1  Bernardin posited that The Challenge of Peace 
served to help “shape the debate” regarding nuclear weapons; the next step, the Cardinal 
continued, would be to help “frame a new consensus concerning nuclear policy.”2  Bernardin 
used the term “new moment” to describe the reality the pastoral letter had created, because it had 
“opened space in the public debate for a consideration of the moral factor.”3  Moving beyond the 
consideration of the use, creation, and maintenance of nuclear weapons, Bernardin went on to 
recognize that “the shaping of a consensus among Catholics on the spectrum of life issues is far 
from finished,” yet the “same searching intellectual exchange, the same degree of involvement of 
clergy, religious and laity, the same sustained attention in the Catholic press” regarding neuralgic 
issues of public morality were necessary to forge the aforementioned Catholic – and later, more 
broadly, public – consensus.4  Far from being simply a religious exercise wherein the Church 
attempted to motivate its own members to act in a certain manner, Bernardin understood “the 
challenge of stating our case, which is shaped in terms of our faith and our religious convictions, 
                                                
1 Joseph Bernardin, “A Consistent Ethic of Life: An American-Catholic Dialogue,” in Selected 
Works of Joseph Cardinal Bernardin: Church and Society, (Collegeville, MN: The Liturgical 
Press, 2001) 82.  
2 Ibid., 84.  
3 Ibid. 
4 Ibid., 88-9. 
Janeczko || 4 
in nonreligious terms which others of different faith convictions might find morally persuasive.”5  
Thus:  
As we seek to shape and share the vision of a consistent ethic of life, I suggest a style 
governed by the following rule: We should maintain and clearly articulate our religious 
convictions but also maintain our civil courtesy.  We should be vigorous in stating a case 
and attentive in hearing another’s case; we should test everyone’s logic but not question 
his or her motives.6 
Bernardin’s Gannon Lecture provides the most basic theological grounding for what follows, 
because the Cardinal realized that for American Catholics to leave a positive mark on their 
nation, they would first need to understand their own teachings.  Then – and only then – could 
Catholics offer a compelling case for one policy or another in a religiously pluralistic society.  
Such grounding did not merely consist of the ability to repeat dogmatic formulas, but rather 
required American Catholics to possess the intellectual and spiritual wherewithal to engage a 
complex moral and political universe in which the laws of the state and the moral teachings of 
the church are not actually – perhaps should not be – equivalent.  For Bernardin, the Church bore 
an obligation both to itself and to the country to evangelize its surrounding culture. In a very 
plain way, the warrant for Christian interaction with the world around it – despite all its 
imperfections – is contained in the Christ event.  The idea that the “Word became flesh” makes 
plain what theologians as varied as Augustine of Hippo and the Fathers of the Second Vatican 
Council grasped: though the world as it is known is passing away, what happens in it still 
matters.  This thesis, therefore, argues that the wrong answers regarding the Church’s 
relationship with the state are as old as Donatist separatism and the Pelagian belief in the 
                                                
5 Ibid., 89. 
6 Ibid.  
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perfectibility of the earthly city.  The right answers, however, are significantly more difficult to 
reach, precisely because of the changing nature of the world and its inherent imperfectability. 
 Christian – and more specifically for our purposes, Catholic – involvement in the world, 
remains a topic of debate because of these difficulties. Even more directly, the reality of 
Catholics bringing their religious beliefs to bear upon the larger American political debate 
remains a contentious issue.  The facts, at least in one sense, speak for themselves: Catholics in 
the American government are here to stay.  For instance, a record number of Catholics sit in the 
current Congress; a Catholic majority sits on the United States Supreme Court, and, as of 2011, 
more than two in five governors were Catholic.7  Indeed, as Michael McConnell mused in a 2011 
lecture at Notre Dame,  “to the extent the Catholicism of a candidate is even noticed, it is more 
likely that people wonder how these public figures can square their professed Catholicism with 
their evident lack of agreement with much that the Church teaches.”8  Aside from McConnell’s 
inquiries, there are also Catholics who question how much their co-religionists ought be involved 
in the actual creation of public policy.  
 Thinkers in the latter position offer a range of opinions: Michael Baxter, writing in 
America Magazine, lays the blame for the phenomenon mentioned above by McConnell at the 
feet of American Jesuit John Courtney Murray.  Baxter concludes that the task of solving 
political problems in America that Murray bequeathed to later generations of Catholics 
backfired: “[I]n performing it, they [American Catholics] have become politically divided. 
[Murray] was confident that a schism over politics would never beset the Catholic community in 
                                                
7 Michael McConnell, “Is There Still a ‘Catholic Question’ in America? Reflections on John F. 
Kennedy’s Speech to the Houston Ministerial Association,” Notre Dame Law Review 86 (2011): 
1636. 
8 Ibid., 1636-37. 
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the United States, but it is well underway.”9  In other words, Murray’s mistake, at least in 
Baxter’s view, was his belief that the interpretation of natural law among Catholics would 
remain univocal.  When it did not, natural law became just another tool in the arsenal of public 
debate, wielded as an ideological cudgel to not only impugn the positions of political opponents, 
but their Catholicity as well. Baxter suggests the overarching purpose of Murray’s life and work 
was to carve out for Catholics in America a place in politics, which he did – successfully.  Yet, 
Baxter believes that the “Murray Project” itself was a victim of its own success, since by 
encouraging Catholics to engage the deepest political questions of their time, Murray also paved 
the way for the severe disagreements within American Catholicism that we now witness.10    
Baxter’s  solution to this atomization is a return to the largely “sectarian” standing of Dorothy 
Day and the Catholic Worker Movement.  Baxter thus asks if “now Catholics are ready to absorb 
“[Dorothy] Day’s antistatist, personalist politics… ‘We are un-American: We are Catholics.’”11  
Baxter alleges that Day realized that politics required compromise and that these same 
compromises often required decisions inimical to Catholicism.  While Baxter himself does not 
sketch out how such a political disengagement may take place, he certainly moves well beyond 
the manner in which those such as Peter Augustine Lawler interpreted Murray’s view on the 
Catholic relationship with the state, claiming the possibility of democracy’s compatibility with 
Catholicism.12  
                                                
9 Michael Baxter, “Murray’s Mistake,” America Magazine (September 23, 2013) accessed March 
6, 2014 at http://americamagazine.org/issue/murray’s-mistake. 
10 Jesuits John O’Malley and Mark Massa have both raised the notion of unintended 
consequences in their studies of church history.  For examples, see Mark Massa’s Catholics in 
American Culture and John O’Malley’s What Happened at Vatican II. 
11 Baxter, “Murray’s Mistake.” 
12 See Peter Augustine Lawler, “Murray’s Natural-Law Articulation of the American 
Proposition” in John Courtney Murray in the American Civil Conversation, (Grand Rapids, MI: 
Eerdmans, 1992).  Lawler writes: “But Murray’s ‘Catholic Reflections’ are not, first of all, those 
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 Such a perspective is not solely reserved to the sectarian, “anti-statist” Catholic. For 
instance, writing in The Review of Politics, Gary Glenn and John Stack outline a significantly 
different argument from Baxter, but end with a similar conclusion.  These two authors ask the 
question, “Is American Democracy safe for Catholicism?” and conclude with a conditionally 
negative answer.   Glenn and Stack identify a change in the language of the Supreme Court in the 
1940s wherein the term “civil liberty” changed to “civil liberties.”13  This shift, they argue, was 
characterized by “intensified license to individual choices and desires as against other 
constitutional goods,” namely “the general advantage of the public.”14  Glenn and Stack suggest 
that the long-term result of this process has been to secularize the modern state insofar as it 
“prohibit[s] non-liberal, anti-civil libertarian, policies.”15  In other words, these two authors 
claim that Catholics in public office are permitted by the secular state to allow their views to 
shape their political positions insofar as they agree with the dominant secular policy narrative.16  
They conclude:  
Our thesis is not that Catholics cannot, in principle, be good democrats without becoming 
secularists.  It is that contemporary American democracy, by constitutionally privileging 
secularism, offers Catholics in public life a strong inducement to abandon, relativize or 
remain silent about their moral beliefs when they conflict with secularism.  Catholics 
                                                                                                                                                       
of a citizen.  Hence he asks not ‘whether Catholicism is compatible with American democracy,’ 
as the American citizen would do.  He asked whether ‘American democracy is compatible with 
Catholicism,’ as the American Catholic must do” (102).   
13 Gary D. Glenn and John Stack, “Is American Democracy Safe for Catholicism?” The Review 
of Politics 62:1 (Winter, 2000) 10. 
14 Ibid., 14.  
15 Ibid., 19.  
16 Ibid.  
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have to act like, not necessarily be, secularists.  That makes it spiritually and politically 
unsafe, not to say impossible, for Catholics to be democrats now.17 
Though a bleak conclusion, the authors’ points are not without merit.  Indeed, the very question 
of the appropriateness of Catholic politicians presenting themselves for Holy Communion (or 
receiving a Catholic burial) while supporting legalized abortion, or the obverse situation, in 
which a Catholic Democratic governor receives scorn from his party due to his opposition to 
legalized abortion, witnesses to the deep divides surrounding this matter.18 
This thesis seeks to answer the question posed on one side by Baxter, Glenn and Stack, 
and modern secularism on the other: should Catholics be involved in the public square, and if so, 
in what manner and by what principles?19  These questions will be addressed in chapters one and 
two respectively.  The third chapter will examine the perspectives of three American Catholic 
politicians in order to illuminate the manner in which Catholics actually envision their 
engagement in the public square.    I will conclude by recalling Bernardin’s two-fold task: “the 
shaping of a consensus in the Church must be joined to the larger task of sharing our vision with 
the wider society. Here two questions face us: the substance of our position and the style of our 





                                                
17 Ibid., 28-29.  Glenn and Stark, at least in my estimation, use the term democrat here in its most 
generic sense, i.e. participating in or supporting a democratically configured state. 
18 See Charles Chaput, Render Unto Caesar, (New York: Doubleday, 2008), especially 158-233. 
19 See Robert Gascoigne, The Church and Secularity: Two Stories of Liberal Society, 
(Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2009), especially 57-66. 
20 Joseph Bernardin, “A Consistent Ethic of Life,” 89. 
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The Manner of Proceeding 
Chapter One begins with a theological overview of relevant portions of Augustine of 
Hippo’s De Civitate Dei (City of God).21    My survey situates Augustine as a product of his time 
and shows, despite perhaps his own reservations to such a supposition, the development of his 
views regarding the relationship between the Christian and the state.22  I will primarily focus 
upon Book XIX of the City of God, which contains Augustine’s efforts to consider the 
relationship between the Church and the state.  Augustine’s City of God crafts a doctrine of the 
heavenly and earthly cities that centers upon the imperfectability of human society, the necessity 
of the grace of Christ, and the overarching ambiguity contained in attempts to inculcate virtue in 
the earthly city, precisely because it does not know Christ.  
 Chapter Two focuses on the work of American Jesuit John Courtney Murray.  The first 
section of this chapter addresses Murray’s little known, yet important, analysis of Gaudium et 
Spes in Theological Studies. This line of enquiry will provide a description of the “question of 
the relation of the Church to human society and of her function in human society,” and 
subsequently, the narrower question of “Church and state.”23  Expectations in this regard ought 
be modest, because again, Murray admits, “In neither case is the treatment systematic; but some 
important principles are stated.”24 Nevertheless, this is an important task because the principles 
                                                
21 Augustine of Hippo, City of God, trans. Henry Bettenson, (London: Penguin Books, 2003) 
XI.1, 429. Hereafter cited as CD with book, chapter, and page number.  
22 My analysis will draw heavily upon Robert Dordaro, Christ and the Just Society in the 
Thought of Augustine (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2004). This exegesis of 
Augustine suggests that the bishop of Hippo’s formulations in the City of God are largely colored 
by his handling of the Pelagian controversy. As such, my examination of Augustine will 
conclude by appropriating the synthesis of Robert Dodaro regarding the long-term theological 
effects of Augustine’s conclusions. 
23 John Courtney Murray, “The Issue of Church and State at Vatican Council II,” Theological 
Studies 27, (December1966) 599.  
24 Ibid.  
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Murray believed Gaudium et Spes elucidated bear greatly on later attempts by the church and her 
members to engage broad issues of human society and the specific interactions between church 
and state.  
After addressing the principles Murray gleaned from Gaudium et Spes, I will move to a 
more specific conversation regarding Murray’s approach to Catholic participation in the 
American state.  Drawing upon Murray’s We Hold These Truths, I will examine the contents of 
his public philosophy.  After this, I will make a further step by developing the prime analogue to 
be used in the Chapter Three: Murray’s writing on the question of the legalization of 
contraception.  Such a move offers a concrete instance of Murray’s distinction between public 
and private morality, as well as his approach to the relationship between morality and legislative 
practice. Chapter Two will conclude with two particular appropriations of Murray’s work on 
matters of public and private morality and the distinction between them. Mary Segers and Todd 
David Whitmore both undertook efforts to project how Murray may have approached legislation 
regarding procured abortions. Neither author questions what Murray’s moral judgment on the 
matter would have been (gravely sinful), but they do disagree as to how Murray would have 
advised the Church to approach matters of legislation criminalizing, restricting, or fully 
legalizing the practice.  In the final account, the major difference between the way Segers and 
Whitmore read Murray stem from their understandings of public and private morality.  And, as 
will be seen in Chapter Three, the manner in which one conceives questions of private and public 
morality bears deeply upon the way that a Catholic politician conceives of the manner in which 
his or her faith ought to figure into political decisions.  
 Chapter Three builds upon the insights gleaned from Chapters One and Two in order to 
frame a distinct case study: the manner in which Catholic American approach the issue of 
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abortion and its legal status in the public square.  This investigation will examine extended 
statements made by three prominent Catholic politicians. The first – and perhaps most famous 
text - is John Kennedy’s speech before the Houston Baptist Ministerial Association during his 
successful presidential bid in 1960.  Though Kennedy does not speak about abortion, he does 
articulate several principles that touch upon the matters Murray considered, while also providing 
a vision of the Christian’s place in the world that contrasts with both Augustine and Gaudium et 
Spes. I will then examine the speeches given by Mario Cuomo and Henry Hyde at the University 
of Notre Dame.  Both take up the issue of the role of a politician’s Catholicism, especially when 
approaching actions legally permitted in the United States, yet considered immoral by Catholics.  
These two politicians are a study in sharp contrasts: yet both can lay claim to furthering the 
legacy of Murray.    
 
An Additional Few Words of Prologue 
 
 This thesis cannot hope to fully answer the question of what it means to be “Catholic in 
America,” nor what it means to be “American and Catholic.”  In fact, it may not even be able to 
parse which term ought have priority in the lives of those who are called to offer public service 
to the state.  What it does attempt to do, however, is to provide a well-reasoned theological 
argument for continued Catholic participation in politics, precisely because Catholics bear an 
obligation to the earthly city.  Chapter One begins with the writings of Augustine of Hippo 
because he was during his lifetime, and remains, one of the most articulate theological voices 
attempting to make sense of one of the main paradoxes in Christian life: what are the obligations 
of the Christian to this world which is passing away?  From Augustine, this work turns its 
attention to John Courtney Murray because of his efforts to show specifically how the Catholic 
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worldview remained compatible with the American Consensus.25  In fact, Murray believed 
Catholics to be in a privileged position to advance this Consensus. Murray’s life ended before the 
completion of his sixty-eighth year, and those who continue the “Murray Project” are left to 
speculate as to how he would have answered the moral questions of later generations.  Segers 
and Whitmore attempt this very task on the matter of abortion and highlight both the strength and 
the weakness of Murray’s thought: it provides a roadmap, but does not offer a method of 
determining if one has arrived at the desired destination.  The final figures examined, in Chapter 
Three, are again, only a representation of the deep thinking offered by American Catholics since 
Murray began his handling of American Church/State issues.  Nevertheless, Kennedy, Cuomo, 
and Hyde, do, in fact, provide the reader with an understanding of the immensity of the task 
undertaken, as well as the great possibilities (and pitfalls) present with any undertaking of 
reflections upon what it means to be both Catholic and American.  The goal of this thesis is to 
argue that the surest way to a “new moment” is to recover Murray’s ideas of a public philosophy 
that, while beginning in religious values, proves itself intelligible to even those who profess no 
creed.   In the final account, then, this thesis is only another chapter in the “Murray Project,” or, 
to be sanguine, another effort at the dialogue mentioned by Murray in the Introduction to We 
Hold These Truths, the dialogue that, he believed, would prevent civility from perishing, and 
with it, the American Consensus.26 
  
                                                
25 John Courtney Murray, We Hold These Truths, (Lanham, MD: Sheed and Ward, 2005) 87-
121.  Hereafter cited as WHTT. 
26 WHTT, 31. 
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Chapter 1: Augustine’s Theology of Participation in the Earthly City 
Introduction 
This chapter seeks to elucidate a theological basis for Catholic involvement in the secular 
state.  It will attempt to answer arguments that suggest that such cooperation pollutes Catholic 
ideals and places Catholic individuals in situations where they are compelled to compromise core 
religious values in order to govern or, because of the ever-increasing divergence between 
Catholic morality and the laws of the state, engage in a fool’s errand without any chance of 
success.  All three of these objections, of course, do have merit.  As stated above, Catholic 
morality is not necessarily well suited for legislation in a modern democracy because it is often 
pressured by claims of religious pluralism and civil liberties that do not necessarily square with 
Catholic moral principles.  At the same time, the very nature of political compromise, human 
sinfulness, and structural sin provide ample evidence for the imperfectability of human society as 
it is currently constituted.  Despite this reality, however, the need for Catholic participation in 
and care for the welfare of the state remains.   
Augustine understood clearly what was at stake in interactions between the earthly and 
heavenly cities.  Rowan Williams described Augustine’s project as being “engaged in a 
redefinition of the public itself, designed to show that it is life outside the Christian community 
which fails to be truly public, authentically political.”27    Williams continued that, for Augustine, 
“the opposition is not between public and private, church and world, but between political virtue 
and political vice.  At the end of the day, it is the secular order that will shown to be ‘atomistic’ 
in its foundations.”28  In Williams’ mind then, as well as in my own, Augustine provides the 
                                                
27 Rowan Williams, “Politics and the Soul: A Reading of the City of God” Milltown Studies 
19/20 (1987), 58. 
28 Ibid.  
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groundwork for imagining a society that both acknowledges that the reality of religious pluralism 
is a given, yet at the same time lays a theological claim that the Christian worldview and its 
subsequent praxis are uniquely suited for developing a more virtuous, just society.  This chapter 
answers in the affirmative the question of whether or not Catholic theology permits its members 
to engage in the world, even to the point of using secular disciplines in this engagement.  It also 
highlights the rationale for such engagement, which is rooted in the intertwined relationship 
between the heavenly and earthly cities.  Moreover, Chapter One anticipates the work of John 
Courtney Murray and his attempts to craft a particular application of Catholic political 
philosophy for use in the American context.   
My first task will be to situate Augustine’s work broadly with the Christian tradition, 
making note of the effect that it still has upon contemporary Christian thought. Augustine’s 
guarded acceptance of secular knowledge as a means of advancing the Christian project is a key 
first principle in developing my project: Augustine held in tension his belief that Christianity was 
the enduring means by which the earthly city and its members could increase in virtue with the 
reality that even the same earthly city had intellectual fruits to offer the Christian project. I will 
do this by examining Book XIX of what is perhaps Augustine’s most well-known work: the City 
of God. Book XIX focuses its attention upon the ambiguity between the definition of virtue in 
the heavenly and earthly cities. In a sense, the poles of Augustine’s thought shift from his earlier 
work De Doctrina to the City of God. In the former work, Augustine attempts to provide a 
justification for the use of secular learning in religious pursuits so as to improve one’s 
understanding of sacred scripture, and by extension, Christian life.  In the latter work, however, 
Augustine attempts to articulate the complex reality of the Christian’s pilgrimage in a fallen 
world.  Augustine continues to make the point that, though the Christian ought not be conformed 
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to the present world, he or she bears obligations to that same world for several reasons.   There is 
continuity present in Augustine’s thought regarding the need and helpfulness of secular learning 
in the religious quest; yet an older Augustine who had been deeply influenced by both his 
episcopal ministry as well as his bruising theological dispute with Pelagius, developed a stricter 
view of the need for Christian participation in the public square in the hopes that the state and its 
members could grow in virtue.  
My treatment of Augustine will conclude with an appropriation of Robert Dodaro’s 
reading of the Augustinian tradition, as he is able to identity that it is the confessional nature of 
Christianity – and its accompanying epistemological honesty – which allows Christian insights to 
form a more just state.  Moreover, this ability to confess fault also gives the Christian the 
confidence to continue working for virtue despite apparent failures and setbacks.  Such a reading 
of Augustine naturally leads to a discussion of Gaudium et Spes, which presents itself as a 
modern reading of the role of the Church (and its members) in the (post-) modern world.  The 
connection here will become apparent since Gaudium et Spes presents both hope for possible 
progress for the earthly city, while remaining aware of the fact that final fulfillment will only 
take place in the heavenly city. 
 
Augustine’s Situation 
Augustine’s reflections in the City of God underlie the inherent ambiguities of Christian 
life: the Christian is obligated to reside in the earthly city (civitas terrena), yet all the while looks 
forward to full entrance into the Heavenly city: these uncertainties are, in the final account, 
mitigated through proper worship of God and charity to one’s neighbor, both of which direct the 
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Christian to the perfection of charity in Christ.29  As a consequence, the true and lasting gift of 
the Christian to the earthly city is not fleeting temporal peace, but rather the message of the 
forgiveness of sins.30 Human virtue, however imperfect, possesses a value for all members of the 
earthly city regardless of their religion.31  Conversely, Augustine’s political theology, if it can be 
called that, is fundamentally rooted in the existence of Christianity as a distinctly different option 
from other modes of life.  Though some view Augustine as advocating a sort of authoritarian 
political posture (and characterize it as a bad thing, pace Niebuhr), others, such as Robert 
Dodaro) find in Augustine a valuable basis for Christian participation in the state for the benefit 
of all involved: 
Less apparent to scholars today is a different Augustinian legacy also centered on the 
politics of confession, one capable of offering at least a partial antidote to the ideological 
pull of statehood, race, philosophy and religion, class and national security: the absolute 
refusal to deny one’s own or one’s party’s role in a shared responsibility for the 
breakdown of the comity.  In this regard, the upshot of Augustinian political thought is 
that it will always be exigent for individuals as well as social groups, to seek the 
reflection of their own images in those of their enemies, and to seek to be reconciled with 
those images.32 
                                                
29 Robert Dodaro, Christ and the Just Society in the Thought of Augustine, 72.  Dodaro draws out 
the notion of Christus totus iustus, commensurate with Augustine’s treatment of the topic in en. 
Ps. 20.2.3.5. 
30 Ibid., 111.  Dodaro cites City of God 19.27 at length to make this point. 
31 Ibid., 113. 
32 Robert Dodaro, “Augustine’s Secular City,” in Augustine and His Critics: Essays in Honor of 
Gerald Bonner, ed. Robert Dodaro and George Lawless (London: Taylor and Francis, 2000), e-
book, 250. 
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Because of this, it is a mistake to engage in attempts to draw strict lines between the earthly and 
heavenly cities of Augustine.33  The Christian is, by the very nature of his or her humanity, 
required to live and work in the earthly city, while waiting for entrance into the heavenly one. As 
a result, equating the visible church with Augustine’s “‘Heavenly City,’ and non-Christians 
solely with his ‘earthly city’ is fundamentally flawed,” since they do not exist as strictly separate 
groups.34  What is more, even those people who root themselves firmly in the earthly city have 
something to contribute to its welfare; the Christian may possess the ability to do this to a greater 
extent, but he or she would be well-served many times in using secular disciplines to do so.35 
Similarly, the proper influence of the earthly city upon Christian life is unclear.  The 
Christian’s participation in the earthly city is not solely physical, nor is his or her commitment to 
the Heavenly City purely eschatological in nature: “the two cities, then, are not cities at all in the 
ordinary sense.  They are moral categories: cosmic communities whose existence spans the 
whole history of the world.”36  Seen in this light, those who recognize “their delight is to worship 
God rather than to be worshipped instead of God,” denote their participation in the Heavenly 
City.37  Such worship for Augustine is primarily expressed by “the sacrifice which the Church 
continually celebrates in the sacrament of the altar, a sacrament well-known to the faithful where 
                                                
33 Eugene Te Selle, for instance, suggests while “Augustine detached himself from ‘sacral 
politics,’ he did not “[posit] anything as neat as a ‘neutral’ sphere.” See Eugene Te Selle, Living 
in Two Cities: Augustinian Trajectories in Political Thought, (Scranton, PA: University of 
Scranton Press, 1998) 42. 
34 Robert Gascoigne, The Church and Secularity: Two Stories of Liberal Society, 20. 
35 Augustine, Teaching Christianity (De Doctrina  Christiana), trans. Edmund Hill, (Hyde Park, 
NY: New City Press, 2013)  1.17,27.  While there is not room within this thesis to discuss the 
significance of De Doctrina within Augustine’s theological development, it ought be noted this 
work lays the groundwork for the later theological developments in CD. From II.17.27 through 
II.42.63, Augustine describes the positive that secular learning may have upon those who wish to 
deepen their understanding and improve their ability to communicate the Christian faith. 
36 R.W. Dyson, The Pilgrim City: Social and Political Ideas in the Writings of Saint Augustine of 
Hippo, (Woodbrigde, UK: Boydell Press, 2001), 11. 
37 CD XI.1, 429.  
Janeczko || 18 
it is shown to the Church that she herself is offered in the offering which she presents to God.”38  
Simultaneously, Augustine recognizes that Christians bear an obligation to maintain the peace of 
the earthly city, despite the transient and fleeting nature of this peace.39  This is a thoroughly 
Augustinian paradox: the relationship between participation in the worship of God in anticipation 
of one’s heavenly citizenship and continuing responsibility for the earthly city.  
Augustine’s work does not only address the actions of individuals, but also recognizes 
that the state itself, while being a consequence of sin, bears a particular import for the world, 
since “it also has the positive task of rectifying the damage caused by sin, and it is understood as 
a means of discipline.”40   When considering the state’s condition, Augustine concludes, “the 
better the objects of this agreement, the better the people, the worse the objects of this love, the 
worse the people.”41  Indeed, in a fallen world, imperfect people create imperfect institutions.  
The result is that in some cases, the most practical reason for a Christian to be involved in 
politics is because of his or her understanding for the need for forgiveness.  The confession of 
Theodosius I thus provides for Augustine an example of humility and the desire for glory.42  In 
highlighting such an Augustinian preference, one must allow that this emperor did possess strong 
                                                
38 Ibid., X.8, 438. 
39 Ibid., XIX.17, 877; Augustine treats war broadly in such places as CD 3.10, 4.15, 19.7, and 22. 
6. He treats the morality of military service more specifically in 1.21 and 1.26, and Ep. 189.4.  In 
reference to the Christian’s life in the state, see CD 5.15-17.  Augustine engages the topic of 
Christian rules in CD 5:24-26.  He uses Emperor Theodosius as a particularly appropriate 
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“Catholic beliefs and virulent opposition to the enemies of the church.”43  Yet at the same time, 
if we are to take Augustine at his word, what really impresses him about Theodosius – as he 
elucidates in CD.V – is the emperor’s manifestation of the reality that “while the judgments and 
actions of rulers will always be subject to sin, they nonetheless retain their capacity to promote 
the public good to the extent that they are free to renounce their own longing for glory by openly 
recalling in thanksgiving the gift of pardon.”44  Such a reality stems from the fact that while the 
effect of peace ordered by the state may be positive, the desire of humans to dominate one 
another is, in and of itself, the result of “altogether intolerable pride” that is seemingly 
unavoidable in the human condition.45 What really matters for Augustine then is how institutions 
may best serve the ultimate task of the Christian project: re-formation of the world according to 
Christian values rather than con-formation of these same values to the world.46 These realities 
are underlined by Augustine’s discussion of the uses of secular education in understanding 
scripture in De Doctrina Christiana, as well as in his broader attempts to justify the participation 
of the Christian in the imperfect earthy city, instead of singularly looking to life eternal in the 
Heavenly City in the City of God. 
 
The City of God 
The reflections of Augustine regarding the participation of the Christian in the earthly 
city are notable, according to Montague Brown, because their meaning “is not found just in the 
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eschaton; it exists in all the particularity of temporal communities and individuals.”47 In City of 
God, Augustine goes to great pains to delineate the difference between the way Christians and 
pagans go about their business in the world.  For all of the progress that the earthly city can 
claim, in the mind of Augustine “classical society and classical political thought provide ideals 
for the corporate life of humanity which they cannot provide the means to realize.”48  In order to 
explain this paradox, Augustine employs allegory, writing “I classify the human race into two 
branches: the one consists of those who live by human standards, the other of those who live 
according to God’s will.  I will call these two classes the two cities, speaking allegorically.”49  
What Augustine is specifically not doing here, however, is presenting two different worlds 
located on the same bit of ground: the earthly city inhabiting one sphere of reality and the City of 
God the other.  Rather, Augustine’s allegory is better understood as recognizing that “although 
the cities do represent very different motivations, the two cities and two desires are, in fact, 
intermingled in this life.”50  This co-existence is due to the inescapable reality that “even a 
member of the Heavenly city must live in the earthly city; and because all creation is in Christ, 
even the members of the earthly city have some inkling of the transcendent importance of God 
and therefore of the right value and use of things.”51  
What separates the two cities is their final destiny.  Augustine explains “by two cities I 
mean two societies of human beings, one of which is predestined to reign with God for all 
eternity, the other doomed to undergo eternal punishment with the devil.  But this is their final 
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destiny.”52  Augustine intuits a temporal reality in which the secular state realizes that peace is a 
happy alternative to unrest and justice preferable to injustice. The best option for maintaining 
order in the secular state thus becomes coercion: members of the Heavenly City living within the 
earthly city are obligated to use these same tools precisely because “they are merely working 
within the inescapable constraints of fallen finitude.”53  
Perhaps because of the inherent difficulties of parsing the proper relationship of the 
Christian to the earthly city, Augustine presents “a scheme for reflecting on the nature of social 
virtue” that avoids “a systematic account of ‘church’ and ‘world.’” 54 Precisely because the 
Christian manner of being in the world is distinct, he or she also possesses a different goal for his 
or her life: “Very different is the reward of the saint.  Here below they endure obloquy for the 
City of God, which is hateful to lovers of this world.  That City is eternal; no one is born there, 
because no one dies.”55  Nevertheless, the Christian cannot completely forget his or her duty to 
the earthly city.  Brown suggests there are two reasons for this, the first being that “it is 
impossible to say to which city one belongs…freedom is real and we can freely turn to God or 
away from God at any one moment in time.”56  Secondly, “as imperfect as the earthly city may 
be, it has a perfection of its own that, as good, will not be lost by a good God.”57  Brown notes 
here Augustine’s underlying rejection of Gnosticism.  Nevertheless, while “the things of the 
world are good … the key … is to use the things of this world in the right way and to live in the 
world virtuously.”58  This underlines the provisional nature of the Christian pilgrimage: on the 
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journey through the earthly city, the Christian finds his or her locus of action proceeding from 
worship that “[reforms] them in nearness of mind” to God.59  This is the precise reason why 
comprehension of scripture is so important to Augustine: scripture remains one of the main 
conduits through the Christian may engage God in worship; moreover, scripture leads one to 
understand the sacrifice of the altar – the Eucharist – whereby the Christian becomes a member 
of the Body of Christ.60 
Regardless of one’s position in relation to authentic Christian worship, all still dwell 
within the domain of the earthly city. Yet the Christian also claims membership in the heavenly 
city that, while affecting one’s earthly life, is rooted in “future hope [rather] than in present 
reality.”61  It is not possible to claim residence solely in the heavenly city while still a member of 
the earthly city.  Therefore, those who claim eschatological residence within the heavenly city 
remain bound by charitable obligation to the earthly one.62   Augustine acknowledges this 
paradox, yet also provides instruction by which a Christian may undertake proper action within 
the temporal realm. Augustine proposes that the proper posture of the Christian within the 
earthly city is that of living in anticipation of citizenship in the heavenly city, while also 
engaging in what he calls a “pilgrimage in this condition of mortality.”63  At the same time, 
Augustine encourages Christians to contribute to the good of the earthly city in order to allow 
more time for believers to prepare for their future lives in the City of God. Correspondingly, 
right actions may encourage those living solely within the earthly city to adjust their actions 
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toward the proper worship of God.64  Worship, in this sense, is not simply liturgical, but rather 
the total orientation of one’s life toward its proper and ultimate end: God.  Consequently, the 
Christian’s relationship to the heavenly city is both eschatological and temporal.  The Heavenly 
City will become the Christian’s permanent residence at a time still unbeknownst to him or her. 
Christians are, therefore, dual citizens: active participants in the earthy city, but also possessing a 
provisional membership in the City of God.  
The final ends of people who primarily classify their citizenship as earthly or heavenly 
differ not always in their practical decisions, but rather in their long-term orientation toward their 
human destinies.  The great hope of the earthly city is for “earthly peace,” while the “Heavenly 
City” attempts to make use of temporal peace in order to facilitate its pilgrimage to 
immortality.65  All are involved in the maintenance of the temporal world, but there are those – 
Christians, one would hope – who possess a nobler goal than peace solely within the earthly city.  
Thus, Christians live as if they were “in a foreign land.”  While peace provides for “harmony,” it 
does not exist as a final end.66  For non-Christians, peace within the earthly city may be a final 
goal; for Christians, however, it is only a means to an end.  The difference here is crucial for 
understanding the way in which Augustine views society as a whole: “[t]he Heavenly City, in 
contrast, knows only one God as the object of worship … he [God] only is to be served with that 
service which the Greeks call latreia, which is due to God alone.”67  Such a statement is 
reminiscent of Augustine’s earlier reflections in CD.XIX.1, “There is, in fact, one city of men 
who choose to live by the standard of the flesh, another of those who choose to live by the 
standard of the spirit.  The citizens of each of these desire their own kind of peace, and they 
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achieve their aim, that is the kind of peace in which they live.”68  The peace of the earthly city is 
good insofar as it facilitates its residents’ ability to offer fitting praise to God.   
R. W. Dyson highlights a helpful distinction between those who participate in the earthly 
city and those who consider its success as the final good.  The latter, Dyson writes they are “the 
community, the ‘camp,’ of all those past and present in whose hearts love of self predominates 
over love of God.”69 For Augustine, such an orientation is a misplacing of values, favoring 
human potentiality over grace.  At the same time, there is a dangerous tendency to reify the 
Heavenly City.  Dyson cautions, “The City of God is not what so many medieval political writers 
wanted it to be…It is the Church, but it is the Church in the broadest sense of the term.”70   In 
other words, the pilgrim church on earth is not coterminous with the City of God, nor will it ever 
be.  The previously mentioned ambiguity of participation and distinction between the cities 
comes into focus here: not only are members of the earthly and Heavenly cities in constant 
contact with one another; membership in both is provisional, insofar as the ordering of one’s life 
determines participation in one city or another. 
 Augustine continues to develop the relationship between the earthly and heavenly cities 
in the second half of CD X.17 by further contrasting the types of “peace” toward which each city 
attempts to move.  He notes that these types of peace are not mutually exclusive, because “that 
City [the city of God] relates the earthly peace to the heavenly peace.”71  Nevertheless, 
Augustine points out that the “heavenly peace … is so truly peaceful that it should be regarded as 
the only peace deserving the name.”72 For the earthly, peace is an end in and of itself.  
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Meanwhile in the heavenly city, temporal peace points toward and facilitates the attainment of 
true peace, one that is “perfectly ordered and completely harmonious [in] fellowship in the 
enjoyment of God.”73  Earthly peace thus prefigures the peace that can only be enjoyed through 
the final realization of heavenly citizenship, or, in the words of Augustine, “This peace the 
Heavenly City possesses in faith while on its pilgrimage … having the attainment of that peace 
in view in every good action it performs in relation to God, and in relation to a neighbor, since 
the life of a city is inevitably a social life.”74 
In CD.XIX.18, Augustine contrasts the speculative work of the academy with that of the 
sure knowledge provided by the Christian faith. Augustine points out that the witness of Sacred 
Scripture does not provide an answer to all temporal questions.  Scripture does, however, provide 
a witness to the “faith by which we walk on our way … in our exile from the Lord.”75 
Augustine’s reflection upon the significance of canonical scripture, as well as its limitations, 
magnifies his previous contentions regarding the life of Christians within the earthly city.  There 
are some matters in the maintenance of the city, he recognizes, that are largely the matter of 
politics, not the formal subject of faith.  Here we find an interesting development from De 
Doctrina to the City of God: Augustine possesses a great optimism about the use of the pagan 
learning in the former work; in the latter, however, Augustine appreciates the fact that “conflict 
over the ultimate purpose [of each city] would be a permanent feature of society.”76  In the City 
of God, Augustine commenced setting up the earthly and heavenly cities as inherently opposed 
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to each other, not on the grounds of superstition or diabolical menace, but rather on the reality 
that a totally Christian society was impossible to imagine.77 
  Book X.19 continues to develop a realistic approach to Christian participation in the 
earthly city.  Augustine recalls a familiar theme: the necessity for Christians to act charitably 
within the earthly city. Augustine posits that charity toward someone who is exclusively a 
member of the earthly city by those who dwell within both cities is not a waste of time. Indeed, 
Christian participation in the earthly city is proper, so long as it does not cause “detriment to his 
faith.”78 Augustine also suggests that properly ordered leisure time allows one to develop a life 
of contemplation in which there is the “chance for the investigation and discovery of truth.”79  
Once again, Augustine does not attempt to articulate rigid delineations between residents of the 
earthly and heavenly, but instead points toward the proper use of one’s time in the earthly city as 
one focused upon “the quest for truth.”80 
 Augustine highlights the paradoxical relationships the Christian will have, both with the 
city that is not yet present (the City of God), as well as the city in which he or she is forced to 
live due to corporeal existence (the earthly city) in CD XIX.20.  He consequently recalls the 
reality of the double-tiered reality of life for a Christian: “if any one accepts the present life in 
such a spirit that he uses it with the end in view of that other life on which he has set his heart 
with all his ardour…such a man may without absurdity be called happy even now, though rather 
by future hope than in present reality.”81  Augustine concludes the chapter by suggesting that all 
human actions should be directed, ultimately, toward the good that is the worship of God.  By 
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phrasing things in this manner, he provides an appropriate path of action for all those who wish 
to be citizens of the heavenly city, but remain bound within the earthly one.  Augustine does not 
suggest ignorance of the present situation nor a flight from reality.  Rather, he argues that there 
exist opportunities within the earthly city whereby one can gain knowledge and experience that, 
if used properly, may direct one towards understanding the correct and final good: God. 
 
Robert Dodaro and Augustine’s Lasting Significance 
 Robert Dodaro describes the work of Augustine regarding Christian participation in the 
state as an attempt to assist in the growth of virtue in the same state.  In Christ and the Just 
Society in the Thought of Augustine, Dodaro focuses his efforts not upon the “communion of 
saints in the heavenly city,” but rather on “the city of God in its earthly pilgrimage.”  An 
exhaustive analysis cannot be provided for Dodaro’s reading of Augustine, since Dodaro himself 
does not admit the ability to conceive of Augustine’s theology of church and state as being able 
to be fully systematized. He comments that “the question ‘how did Augustine conceive the just 
society?’ involves aspects of his thinking about Christ, human knowledge, the church, and 
scriptural hermeneutics, as well as political thought and ethics.”82  Dodaro’s key insight here, 
however, is one that will provide a bridge between the thought of Augustine to Gaudium et Spes 
and beyond: Augustine sees a distinct connection “between Christ’s role in mediating virtue to 
the soul and his role in establishing the just society.”83  The corresponding supposition is 
articulated succinctly by Rowan Williams: “classical society and classical political thought 
provide ideas for the corporate life of humanity which they cannot provide the means to 
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realize.”84  In the following treatment of Dodaro’s work, two particular themes will be developed 
so as to set the stage for a harmonious transition to work of John Courtney Murray.  The first 
theme centers on the significance of Christ in Augustine’s view of the just society.  The second 
theme is more historical in nature, flowing out of both the effects the Pelagian controversy had 
upon Augustine’s conception of the future of the state, as well as slow collapse of the Roman 
Empire. 
The most basic conclusion reached through the reading of Augustine’s “theology” of 
church and state – or, more accurately, the believer within the state – suggests that a truly just 
state bases itself fully in Christ.  As such, the perfect state will never exist conterminously with 
the earthly city. “Augustine maintains that justice cannot be known except in Christ,” and, 
because of this, all attempts to create a just state remain provisional and limited this side of the 
parasouia.85  Nevertheless, Dodaro characterizes Augustine’s argument as positing that “Christ 
creates this just society through his mediation of divine humility to human beings through his 
incarnation.”86  In other words, Augustine believed the action of the Christian in the larger world 
to be a fundamentally religious undertaking.  While particular actions may involve engagement 
with secular arts or coercive measures, most fundamental to any ultimate improvement of society 
is its development from the virtues exemplified, and indeed personified by, Christ.  
Dodaro builds upon the extended conversation of Augustine in CD.XIX regarding the 
relationship between the earthly and heavenly cities, by coupling it with CD.XX and noting that 
beyond one’s birth into original sin, human sin continues because humans “do not know how to 
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act justly or because they fail to do so through moral weakness.”87  Indeed, individual virtue is 
the building block of civic improvement.  Dodaro thus rightly supposes that “for Augustine, 
discourse about justice cannot sustain a just society unless the statesman who offers it is also 
capable of purifying his listeners’ souls.”88  This line of reasoning corresponds to Augustine’s 
basic Christological supposition: “Christ is the only completely just man ever to have lived.  
Moreover, he alone justifies other human beings by purifying and healing the soul of ignorance 
and weakness.”89  Augustine, it seems, is up to two things here.  He claims Christ as the center of 
any structure of virtue and thus suggests the necessity of Christ’s example. He also emphasizes 
the over-arching necessity of the grace of Christ insofar as it mitigates against a works-based 
conception of human achievement.  The argument acknowledges that human works are 
necessary in the secular world; yet they only are good in terms of their imitation of Christ, and 
only possible because of Christ’s gracious example. 
 The City of God’s formulation within the Pelagian controversy further complicates 
matters because, “Augustine and Pelagius disagree over the precise role of Christ in 
exemplifying perfect justice and in enabling Christians to follow his example.”90  He continues 
by explaining that Pelagius “disagrees with Augustine over the specific ways grace aids the soul 
in knowing and willing the moral good.”91 Pelagius is ready and willing to elucidate other 
examples of virtue commensurate with that of Christ; for Augustine, however, this is 
unthinkable, regardless of the admitted sanctity of Pelagius’ examples.92  The “takeaway” 
message from the Pelagian (counter)influence on the City of God is that Augustine emphasizes 
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“the disproportionate character of the relationship between Christ’s example and that of other 
just human beings.”93  Correspondingly, the theological disagreement regarding the person of 
Christ between Augustine and Pelagius is magnified vis-à-vis one’s reasonable hopes for the 
secular state.  And so, Augustine’s “analysis in Books 2-19 of the effects of moral ignorance and 
weakness on the practice of justice, and of the contrary effects of Christ’s redemptive activity for 
the promotion of justice, is shaped by the Pelagian controversy.”94  Such confidence in the 
efficacy of Christ’s sacrifice and ability to mediate grace therefore colors Augustine’s confidence 
in human endeavors.  This emphasis on Christ places the true locus of hope for societal 
improvement upon believers; this is not to say, of course, that non-believers cannot achieve 
certain virtues.  CD XIX makes this clear.  What it also means, however, is that in the mind of 
Augustine, any overarching structural changes toward virtue will most likely originate in a 
Christian worldview, and any hope of maintaining gains in the face of sin will certainly reside in 
Christian praxis.  
 This brief explication of certain elements of Augustine’s City of God, sets the broader 
stage for what follows.  Augustine knew that for the majority of Christians, flight from the 
material world was not only impossible, but inadvisable.  Early in his career, Augustine 
suggested that secular methods of learning could help the Christian progress in virtue because it 
opened for him or her additional avenues into understanding scripture.  In later years, Augustine 
built upon this insight, and suggests that life in the earthly city necessarily compelled the 
Christian to interact in this same city: merely waiting for salvation did not constitute virtuous 
behavior.  What is more, Augustine believed that Christian participation in the earthly city could, 
in fact, increase the virtue of the city, and lead others to greater virtue themselves.  Yet this 
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development in his worldview was only possible because of his earlier recognition of the 
usefulness of pagan learning and intellectual resources.  Its usefulness for my project should now 
become clearer: Christian engagement with the state ought not be viewed imperialistically, as if 
Christianity bears all the answers for the ailments of the world.  At the same time, however, 
Christianity is an integral component of any improvement in virtue and justice for which the 
state may hope.  Augustine may not provide specific answers for what is to be done to increase 
virtue in the public square in the current time and place, but a careful reading of his theological 
outline for the interaction of church and state, while also adducing the understanding that such 
participation will necessarily lead to political compromise. With this in mind, we now turn to the 
work of John Courtney Murray: Murray, though not often quoting Augustine, builds upon many 
of Augustine’s themes.  What is more, Murray attempts to answer the broader Augustinian 
question in the specific terms of the United States: what ought the Catholic do (and not do) and 
support (and not support) when faced with a pluralistic earthly city?   
 As I turn to Murray’s work, it will be important to keep in mind that Augustine himself 
saw the opportunity for the creation of a purely Heavenly City as an eschatological eventuality; 
in the meantime, however, the Christian bore an obligation to work towards moving the locus of 
the earthly city toward its heavenly destiny.  Indeed the Christian must contend with “the rise, 
the development and the destined ends of the two cities, the earthly and the heavenly, the cities 
which we find, as I have said, interwoven, as it were, in this present transitory world, and 
mingled with one another.”95 John Courtney Murray engaged these questions: his work spanned 
over parts of three decades and an ecumenical council.  The discussion now turns toward Murray 
in an attempt to discover his approach to the “interwoven” nature of the heavenly and earthly 
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cities so as to point the way to the conclusion of this work: a better understanding of how 
Catholics have gone about articulating their beliefs in this complex reality.  
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Chapter 2: John Courtney Murray and the Church and State Problematic 
Introduction 
 Chapter Two seeks to accomplish two major tasks.  The first of these is to explore the 
church and society problematic as articulated by John Courtney Murray.  This will be achieved 
by examining a representative example of Murray’s pre-conciliar writings regarding church and 
state issues and his treatment of Gaudium et Spes. Next, I will examine Murray’s application of 
these principles to the issue of contraception.  Murray’s writings on this topic included essays 
within We Hold These Truths and his undated memo to Cardinal Richard Cushing of Boston.  
The latter source provides for us a direct application of his principles to a real-world case.  The 
second task of this chapter is to formulate a case study of sorts, using Murray’s general 
principles as well as his writing on contraception to consider how Murray may have responded to 
the question of the legalization of procured abortion.   The works of Mary Segers and Todd 
David Whitmore will frame this part of the project.   
This chapter builds on the first by providing evidence of both development and continuity 
within the Augustinian perspective, and by also answering in a specifically American context the 
scope and ability of Christianity’s influence upon the secular state.  If Chapter One provided an 
Augustinian entrance point to the church/state problematic, then Chapter Two will take the 
reader through some important moments of evolution in Church teaching regarding the 
relationship of church and state.  Chapter Three will continue this line of argument, but make 
specific efforts to blend the approaches of the first two chapters by examining the comments of 
John Kennedy, Mario Cuomo, and Henry Hyde regarding the church/state problematic generally, 
and the topic of abortion legislation more specifically. Kennedy’s comments do not particularly 
apply to abortion, yet they are central to our discussion.  Cuomo and Hyde comment about the 
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role of the Catholic vis-à-vis abortion in the secular state: all three of these thinkers will be 
examined in light of Murray’s previously explained principles.  
 
Pre-Conciliar Perspective 
 The views of John Courtney Murray regarding matters of church and state in the pre-
conciliar period are well analyzed and categorized. Murray’s theological reflections appeared 
well before their time, catching the attention of such noted American conservatives as Francis 
Connell in The Ecclesiastical Review and W. Butterfield in The Clergy Review.96  Their concerns 
subsequently made it to the desk of the Cardinal Secretary of the Holy Office, Alfredo 
Ottaviani.97  Murray’s writings never led him to be officially censured by the Vatican, yet his 
Jesuit superiors did instruct him to cease writing on matters of church and state.  Though Murray 
would be vindicated in part by his appointment as a peritus for Cardinal Spellman of New York 
during the Second Vatican Council, at the time of his silencing Murray thought the cause lost, 
even clearing his shelves at Woodstock of those works concerning this topic and returning them 
to the library.98  
For the purposes of this thesis, I will examine a representative work of the pre-conciliar 
Murray, the last in a series of articles published in Theological Studies in the early 1950s 
regarding matters of church and state.  Reprinted in the anthology Religious Liberty, Murray 
titled his 1955 article on the subject “Leo XIII and Pius XII: Government and the Order of 
Religion.” Here Murray “attempted to separate Leo XIII’s reclaimed focus on social dualism 
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from his endorsement of establishment and intolerance.”99  The article is notable for both its 
complexity and its breadth.  Therefore, I shall only highlight a few portions of the article that are 
necessary to understand later developments in Murray’s thought.  
Murray seeks to trace Leo’s arguments to their logical conclusions, noting that true 
religion (and thus proper formation of conscience) actually provide constructive assistance to the 
larger society.  What is more, Murray reads Leo’s encyclical Rerum Novarum as suggesting that 
the role of the government is not to create a just society, but rather to order it.   Through the 
entirety of the following analysis, it will be helpful to keep in mind what I consider to be a key 
hermeneutical question asked by Murray of Leo, and, one which should also be asked of the rest 
of the views presented herein: “Is this legal institution [that is supported or proposed] necessary 
or useful for the common good of the church and the state within a particular society, and also of 
the universal church and international community?”100 
One of the areas addressed by Murray is the situation of the Christian in the world, since 
a person who professes a religious creed still remains a citizen of the state.  Murray addresses 
here what ought be by now a familiar paradox, proposed by Augustine in the City of God.  
Initially, Murray outlines Leo’s efforts to maintain the “‘principle of principles’, that is, the 
freedom of the Church.”101  This freedom exists in the spiritual realm, allowing the Church to 
handle its spiritual affairs as it sees fit.   Such freedom also recognizes that the Church 
“importantly includes a civil freedom, an empowerment in the face of civil society.”102  Leo 
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himself recognized the dual trajectory of human existence, but claimed that the human subject 
ought to be “undivided in the inner unity and integrity of his conscience by any conflict between 
the two authorities, ecclesiastical and civil, to which he owes obedience.”103  Such a relationship 
plays itself out specifically in reference to the “goodness of laws,” which is determined, Murray 
reasons, by the answer to the question: “is this law necessary or useful for the common good in 
the given circumstances?”104  Murray qualifies the question further: “the morality of a law is not 
an immediate guarantee of its necessity or utility. Still less is the badness of one law an 
immediate proof of the goodness of its contrary.”105  Murray thus engages both the question of 
the Christian’s loyalty to the laws of the state and the possible ability of these laws to promote 
the common good.  He cites Leo XIII’s dashed hopes that “ideally speaking, the fortunes of 
religion should never become so entangled with the politics of government; but such 
entanglements are inevitable when politics becomes the field of ideological battles.”106  Yet, with 
Leo, Murray suggests that “true religion, so runs the further argument, is a thing of the highest 
advantage to society; therefore the care of it counts among the purposes of government.”107  
Simultaneously, Murray, hearkening to Rerum Novarum, posits that the most basic role of 
government is “to create the conditions of order under which original vitalities and forces, 
present in society, may have full scope to create the values by which society lives.”108  Murray 
concludes: 
But the value of order resides primarily in the fact that it furnishes opportunitates, 
facilitates (the Leonine words, cited above) for the exercises of the freedoms which are 
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the rightful prerogative of other social magnitudes and forces.  These freedoms, rightly 
ordered, are the true creative sources of all manner of social values.109 
By citing Leo, Murray underlines the paradoxical relationship in the life of a Christian between 
the values of the Church and his or her duty to the state.  The Church, for its part, has twin 
obligations: teaching its own members, as well as attempting to provide moral guidance for the 
state.  The state is required to attempt to create an environment whereby its citizens are most able 
to flourish.  This triangular relationship is further complicated when the state does not desire to 
follow the moral leadership of the Church, and the Church remains unable to compel its moral 
view to be legislated by the state.  This conflict would continue to be the subject of Murray’s 
thought throughout his career.  And, if the topics covered in the following pages are any 
indication, it is a problem still very much seeking a satisfactory solution. 
Another helpful achievement of Murray is his delineation of three principles of tolerance 
in Leo XIII’s reflections.  The significance of this achievement by the Pope may not at first seem 
obvious.  However, for Murray, who at the time was attempting to find “growing ends” in the 
traditional understanding of the Church/state relationship, the Pontiff’s conclusions proved vital.  
Murray distilled from Leo’s two encyclicals, Libertas and Immortale Dei, three pertinent 
principles regarding toleration. Murray first notes that Leo recognizes that “error and evil, 
religious division and moral discord, are permanent aspects of our sinful condition.”110  In other 
words, Leo believed that God allowed a less-than-perfect world to continue to exist, even if the 
reasons remained unknown.  This first conclusion, therefore, is grounded in an Augustinian 
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reality that is subsequently explained through a neo-Thomist heuristic.111 Leo continues with this 
Thomist line of reason by recognizing that tolerance itself is not a vice.  Rather, “it is an 
imitation of God; it is an act of virtue – the virtue that distinguishes the jurist and the statesman, 
political prudence.”112  This Augustinian/Thomistic synthesis gains further clarity here: situated 
in an imperfect world, the responses of those tasked with judging humans against the standards 
of the moral law differ from those tasked with creating civil laws in an effort to summon out 
more virtuous behavior from the people.  Moral and legal toleration are different because their 
ends are, in and of themselves, different, though not necessarily opposed. The third principle 
Murray underlines is best quoted in full, because it is Murray’s incisive best: “he [Leo] asserts 
that principle that at once makes necessary the virtue of tolerance and also sets the limiting norm 
for its exercise, namely, the exigencies of ‘the common good,’ the public welfare in given 
circumstances.”113  Once again, Murray highlights the inherent difficulty of Leo XII’s age: 
What is more important, he [Leo] makes his whole doctrine hinge on his cardinal 
principle – the distinction between Church and state, between the order of ethics and 
theology and the order of law and politics, between the dogmatic judgment of the Church 
and the legal decisions of government.114 
In a certain sense, Murray recognized in Leo the historically-conditioned problematic first 
presented by Augustine: how must the Christian act in the secular state?  What is more, just as 
Augustine had moved from the optimism and careful engagement with pagan culture in De 
Doctrina to a more complicated and ambiguous position in the City of God, so too does Murray 
see Leo as moving in a direction wherein he does not force “upon organized society and its 
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government the same single norm of judgment and action by which the Church must abide.”115  
In an effort to better understand how the Church ought interact with a world that did not 
recognize the priority of religious authority in determining the how the political sphere should be 
ordered, Murray saw Leo as taking a decisive step toward constructing a doctrinal configuration 
in which the Church could present plausible, if imperfect, solutions to real-world problems.  
Murray provides context to such a realization by speaking directly to the reality that one type of 
government is not necessarily better than other.  Murray, for instance, muses that the current 
constitutional government in Spain is not superior to American constitutionalism solely because 
the former had entered into agreements with the Holy See.116  In this sense, Murray, therefore, 
avoids committing to what he calls a “unitary doctrine.”117 He reasons: “But what matters is the 
identity of the norms of judgment.  The point is that the American and the Spaniard would both 
be arguing from a unitary premise, complex in its content, which would be mutually shared as 
the doctrine of the universal Church.”118   
One can see here the basis upon which Murray will base his later theological reflections 
upon the Church’s presence in a pluralistic state. If Murray’s reading of Leo is correct and “good 
law – necessary and useful for the public advantage” is the primary task of the state, then the 
locus of Catholic participation in the state may originate in religious faith, but may not remain or 
even culminate there.119  Rather, those Catholics who participate in the secular state must possess 
the ability to translate Catholic principles in a manner that is both faithful to those principles, 
while also remaining intelligible to the state they wish to serve.  In the final analysis, Murray 
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presents a question that requires answering: “Is this legal institution necessary or useful for the 
common good – both of Church and state within a particular society, and also of the universal 
Church and the international community?”120  The manner in which Murray concludes also 
provides an appropriate segue into his work regarding Gaudium et Spes, because it presents the 
premise with which both he, as well as the Council, grappled so mightily: “If therefore the full 
Catholic doctrine on establishment and intolerance were consolidated in this form, the 
constitution of a unitary Catholic position, permitting a variety of applications, would be 
complete.”121  This search for a “unitary” position that may also admit applications of various 
sorts based upon time and circumstance is further developed in Gaudium et Spes, and so, it is to 
John Courtney Murray’s analysis of this document to which we now turn. 
 
John Courtney Murary and Gaudium et Spes: An Initial Assessment 
The next step in our discussion involves an analysis of the Second Vatican Council’s 
final document, The Pastoral Constitution on the Church in the Modern World, Gaudium et 
Spes.122  While what can reasonably be classified as a positive outlook on human progress is 
present throughout the document, its length and scope does indeed serve notice that the Council 
Fathers believed there still existed much progress to be made. My attempts to investigate the 
points of continuity between Augustine and GS will be coupled with the explanations provided 
by a largely forgotten (though incisive) article published by John Courtney Murray in 
Theological Studies.  “Church and State at Vatican II” took up what Murray believed to be the 
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accomplishments of the Declaration on Religious Freedom, and placed them in the further 
context of GS.123  Both of these documents, Murray explained, were grounded in their attempts 
to “develop the doctrine of recent popes on the inviolable rights of the human person and on the 
constitutional order of society.”124  The truly important advance, however, was not a matter of 
dogmatic theology centered purely upon the internal life of the Church proper, but rather moved 
toward “certain significant contributions towards a development of doctrine in regard to the 
Church-state issue.”125  For Murray, “the Constitution on the Church in the World Today 
confirmed, and in certain respects, advanced, this development.”126 
 Murray continued his pursuit of the task undertaken in “Government and the Order of 
Religion” in his writing on GS.  In this article, he suggested that the fundamental goal of Leo 
XIII “was the establishment of a Christian order in the whole of society.  The orderly 
relationship between the two powers was simply a subordinate aspect of this larger goal.”127  
Indeed, “The issue of the diarchy as such had begun to lose its ancient primacy.”128  Diarchy, as 
understood by Murray, referred broadly to his understanding of the twin powers of the church 
and state configured in way so as to engage in mutual “co-operation toward the integral good of 
the ‘same one man, both Christian and citizen’ whom they both encounter … in the concrete life 
of society.”129 Murray believed that Leo XIII found himself less concerned with the theological 
relationship between church and state than with the actual improvement of society.  What is 
more, Murray, in examining chapters three and four of GS, noted a “basically Leonine 
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inspiration,” but also “the development of doctrine beyond its Leonine stage.”130  He concluded, 
“The source of the development lies in a broadening of the perspectives in which the question is 
viewed.”131  While further explanation of the influence of Leo and the Council’s response is not 
necessary, it suffices to note along with Murray two important interpretive factors for GS.  While 
Leo XIII’s view of the world largely referred to Europe, the Council Fathers at Vatican II took a 
more expansive view than their predecessors. When the Council wrote about human society, it 
meant the entire world.  Equally as important for understanding the advances of GS is the reality 
that Leo possessed a “religio-civilizational outlook [that] was related to his historical outlook, 
which was simple and narrow.”132  Murray explains: 
The medieval era was the golden age of Christian unity, of harmony between the two 
powers, and of the obedience of princes and peoples to the authority of the Church.  Then 
came the Reformation, which was a revolt against the authority of the Church, the rupture 
of Christian unity, and the origin of a profound civilizational change.133 
Though Leo could look back on these days with forlorn yearning, Vatican II “relinquished this 
[the era of Christian unity] and adopted a prospective view [of history].”134  Simply put, while 
Leo XIII adopted a theological attitude of recovery, Vatican II, Murray reasoned, sought a future 
world that was possibly better than past eras. 
 Before a deeper engagement of GS, it may be helpful to summarize what Murray 
believed Vatican II had accomplished.  Largely commensurate with previous explanations 
Murray undertook in describing the shift from a classical worldview to historical consciousness, 
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Murray named two particular overarching theological achievements.135  “The first,” he wrote, 
was “a rising consciousness of the dignity of the human person,” while the second centered upon 
“a mounting movement toward the unity of the human family.”136  The effect of all this was “an 
increasing realization, in all manner of institutional forms, both of human dignity and of human 
unity.”137  In this way, Vatican II generally, and documents such as DH and GS specifically, 
realized that “the future of civilization on this earth depends, not solely on the Church, but on the 
widest possible co-operative effort.”138  Indeed, if Leo XIII took the first steps back from a rigid 
Church-state diarchy, then the Council took the next logical steps by “[insisting] that the inherent 
sense of the Gospel summons the Church to the task of lifting man [sic] to his true dignity and of 
knitting the bonds of human community.”139  Just as Augustine had believed that Christianity 
had particular contributions to make to secular society, so too did GS.  Indeed, GS seems willing 
both to employ the relationship between the Christian and secular education as does De 
Doctrina, while at the same time endorsing the necessity of the Christian in the state if, in fact, a 
more effective virtue is to be present.  
Murray recognized, at least as early as the publication of John XXIII’s encyclical Pacem 
in Terris, that there existed a need to recognize a difference between the society and the state.140  
For Murray, John XXIII offered “a development of the tradition” by “[accepting] the distinction 
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that seems to be missing from Leo XIII, namely, the distinction between society and the state.”141  
The consequences of this, Murray continued, was that the freedom offered by society and the 
state itself could differ: the state, rooted in “the ancient principle of constitutionalism” ought 
have the power of its government bound by the same constitution.142  The role of the state is thus 
to “guarantee the juridical order, that is to say, the whole order of human rights and duties whose 
roots are in the human person as situated in the contemporary world.”143  Murray appears to 
leave the consequences of this development for society itself largely unexplained.  The very 
conclusion of his comments regarding Pacem in Terris, however, provide an important clue: 
“Man, therefore, manifests himself as the image of God chiefly by his intelligent, confident 
efforts to master the course of historical events and direct it toward the common good of the 
peoples of the earth.”144  In Murray’s mind, the theological distinction between the state and 
society is, in a way, an example of the jurisprudential principle: the most freedom possible, with 
the least amount of restriction.  Such a demarcation, then, allows the state to offer its citizens the 
freedom needed to mine the full potential of the earthly city, while still reserving its right to act 
in such a way as to restrict the freedom of individuals in order to protect the common good.  Of 
course, two larger questions remained unanswered by Murray: at what point is the state obligated 
to enact such restrictions and how ought one define the common good?   
 
“Church and State at Vatican II”: A New View of the Ancient Problematic 
 In reviewing Gaudium et Spes, Murray suggested that the “Church-and-society-
problematic” contained two major concerns.  GS attempted to “reaffirm the Leonine distinction 
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between the two societies,” as well as “reaffirm the transcendence of the Church to the temporal 
order.”145  Murray roots such claims in Chapter Four of the document, wherein the role of the 
church in the modern world is addressed.  Paragraph 40 echoes this theme, as it suggests that the 
Church possesses “a saving and eschatological purpose which can be fully attained only in the 
next life.”146  It continues, “But it is now present here on earth and is composed of men [sic]; 
they the members of the earthly city, are called to form the family of the children of God even in 
this present history of mankind and to increase it continually until the Lord comes.”147  However, 
GS does not place the responsibility for the advancement of humanity solely upon the shoulders 
of Catholics, since it is also noted that the Church embarks on the “same journey as all mankind 
and shares the same earthly lot in the world.”148 And: “The Church, then, believes it can 
contribute much to humanizing the family of man and its history through each of its members 
and its community as a whole.”149 GS goes on to note that not only may other Christian 
denominations act as a leaven for the world, but also that “there is a considerable and varied help 
that it can receive from the world in preparing the group for the Gospel, both from individuals 
and from society as a whole, by their talents an activity.”150  Here is a point of contact, in fact, 
between the previously considered works of Augustine and the Council.  Not only is there raised 
the prospect of secular arts assisting in the work of the Gospel but also the contributions that 
members of the earthly city may make toward the common good is not dismissed.    
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 GS next turns, in paragraph forty-one, to the contributions that the Church may make to 
individuals. The Church serves a two-fold function: prophetic witness and conduit to Christ.  At 
the same time, GS recognizes the advances made by society as a whole in advancing the rights of 
humanity.  Thus, the Church “acknowledges and holds in high esteem the dynamic approach of 
today which is fostering these rights all over the world.”151  Simultaneously, “There is a 
temptation to feel that our personal rights are fully maintained only when we are exempt from 
every restriction of divine law.”152  Once again, the Council attempts to chart a middle path, both 
recognizing the important (one could say necessary) role that it has to play in an individual’s life, 
while also allowing that its involvement is not compulsory.  Quite to the contrary: Divine Law 
permits one the freedom to achieve higher virtue; it does not suggest coercive law that demands a 
certain (possibly virtuous) behavior through threat of punishment. 
 Murray himself picks up the Council’s work in paragraph forty-two: GS here addresses 
what the Church provides for the wider society.  The document initially sets a distinct theological 
goal for the Church: “Christ did not bequeath to the Church a mission in the political, economic, 
or social order: the purpose he assigned was a religious one.”153  Consequently, the Church is 
“not committed to any one culture or to any political, economic or social system.”154  This 
means, of course, that GS claims for the Church a role in any type of society or situation.  
Murray detects here an advance on Leo’s previously stated lack of preference for a particular 
political system. Leo “[endeavored] to disentangle the Church from the institution of monarchy, 
without at the same time committing the Church to democratic institutions;” the Council itself 
implies a preference toward a political state that possesses “a consciousness of the dignity of the 
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person and a recognition of human rights.”155  Murray recognizes that these sections of GS avoid 
a dangerous tendency to equate the transcendence of the world with isolation from it.  Instead, 
Murray here again recognized an inherently Augustinian idea, picked up by Leo and finally 
codified within GS.  Murray quotes a passage from Leo’s Immortale Dei in order to illustrate the 
identity the ambiguity that GS respects: 
That immortal work of a merciful God, which is the Church, does indeed, per se and of 
its very nature, look to the salvation of souls and to their achievement of happiness in 
heaven. Nevertheless, in the world of mortal man it is the source of so many and such 
great benefits that it could not have been brought forth more or greater benefits if it had 
been instituted, primarily and chiefly, to further the prosperity of life here on earth.156 
This is, in Murray’s words, “the traditional paradox.”157   
Murray attempts to explain, and, at least to some extent, resolve, this ambiguity by taking 
into account the “hint of triumphalism” present in the first half of chapter forty-one of GS, as 
well as its mitigation by the second half of this chapter.  Murray sees a misplaced confidence in 
the chapter when GS presumes that Church not only brings the light of progress and virtue to its 
own members, but also to the world as a whole.  He also detects, in the final account, 
aggiornamento: “From now on, the Church defines her mission in the temporal order in terms of 
the realization of human dignity, the promotion of the rights of man, the growth of the human 
family towards unity, and the sanctification of the secular activities of this world.”158 Murray’s 
reading of GS seems commensurate with Augustine’s belief that members of the Church bore 
some responsibility for the welfare of the secular world. GS sees the church playing a 
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fundamental role within secular society.  The difficult knot to unwind was, as it still is now, how 
the Church ought to articulate ultimately spiritual goals to a people who may not be particularly 
spiritual.  Further complicating the matter is the implied futility of any effort to improve secular 
society that is not first rooted in a manifestation of Christian virtue begotten by Christ.   
 
A Growing End: Murray’s Critique of Gaudium et Spes 
 Throughout his essay on the issue of Church and state at Vatican II, Murray remains 
optimistic.  However, in considering GS’s treatment of “the political community,” Murray calls 
the document “uninspired and inadequate.”159  The fundamental complaint of Murray stems from 
the assertion that there is no mention of the need for those governed to provide their consent to 
their governors. He notes that “mention is made of the ‘pluralist society’ (an almost last-minute 
addition to the text) [and it is] this type of society [which] gives rise to today’s problem of the 
relations of Church and state.”160  Murray faults the document for failing to make a “firm 
affirmation that the pluralist society presents not only the normal but the normative context for 
any theories of these relations.”161  He asserts that pluralism is not only the typical situation of 
the political state, but also, for the governed peoples themselves, the desired situation.  Though 
GS did not admit this, Murray believes that the document ought to have done so.  However, 
Murray is not prepared to completely dismiss the efforts of GS on this topic.  He locates hope in 
paragraph seventy-six which notes that the Church is “at once the sign and the safeguard of the 
transcendental dimension of the human person.”162  This supposition by GS underlines for 
Murray the notion that the “essential basis of the Church’s claim to freedom in the face of all 
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public powers” is precisely its ability to lead the human community to a greater awareness.163  In 
his analysis, Murray determines that GS is willing to accept the “secularity of the secular order,” 
yet simultaneously maintains that that this same order ought to be open to religious values.164  
Other works by Murray will suggest that such a relationship is improved when religious values 
are communicated in a manner intelligible to the secular order, through a persuasive, rather than 
coercive manner.165 
 In his concluding comments, Murray reflects upon the true nature of the Church’s 
mission in secular society: the primary locus of the Church remains, and always has been, 
spiritual, yet there has been growth by the Church in its responsibility to the secular realm.  
Moreover, this relationship is now conceived in a more balanced way: conversion of people and 
establishment of the Church’s rights are no longer the order of the day after GS.  Murray reasons 
that “the mode of entrance is purely spiritual, since it takes the form simply of moral judgment 
on political affairs, and since the grounds of judgment are metapolitical, having to do with the 
rights of man and the salvation of souls.”166 Murray cites paragraph seventy-six again, because 
here GS notes that the Church “never places its hopes in any privileges accorded to it by civil 
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authority; indeed, it will give up the exercise of certain legitimate rights whenever it becomes 
clear that their use will compromise the sincerity of its witness.”167  As has been the case 
throughout the article, Murray attempts to highlight the doctrinal developments proposed by 
Gaudium et Spes, yet at the same time point to its continuity.   
What is remarkable here is the seeming relevance of the previously examined material of 
Augustine for this topic.  Indeed, Murray, as well as the Council, seemed to recognize that 
Augustine’s distinction between the heavenly and earthly cities, as well as the ambiguity inherent 
in their mutual successes and memberships, remain helpful in the modern world.  Nevertheless, 
Murray also recognized the needed developments proposed by GS, while still reserving his 
ultimate judgment on the efforts of the Council because he believed it was neither specific nor 
far-reaching enough.    Murray did applaud DH and GS because it was “clearly the mind of the 
Council that the institution of religious freedom is not hypothesis but thesis – a matter of 
doctrine, not of historical circumstance.”168  He also concluded “new theological insights into the 
concrete reality of the pilgrim Church, and other new insights made available by secular 
experience (notably the experience of the relation between religious freedom as a human right 
and the freedom of the Church), have resulted in a genuine and fruitful development of 
doctrine.”169   At the same time, Murray questioned why there was “no firm affirmation that the 
pluralist society presents not only the normal but also the normative context for any theory of 
these relations.”170  Murray seemed to realize that for all of the value that the writings of Leo 
XIII and Pius XII had for the church/state problematic, they, like the Council Fathers, did not 
appear ready to fully accept the political realities of the modern world.  Though “freedom” had 
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been added in a papal pronouncement for the first time in a papal document in Pacem in Terris, 
the full import of this development had not yet been felt by the conclusion of Vatican II.171  In a 
sense, such a relationship still requires explication.   For a final time, therefore, it is necessary 
here to draw the connection between Augustine’s City of God and Murray’s interpretation of GS: 
secular and religious knowledge interplay with each other on a series of levels.  For one, those 
who hope for eternal life in the heavenly city witness to their hope in the earthly city; at the same 
time, people who are solely members of the earthly city posses the ability to teach and facilitate 
the ultimately Christian goal of growing an earthly city greater in virtue.   
Simultaneously, the ultimate goals of the heavenly city remain both intertwined and 
separate from those of the earthly city: while the earthly city may only hope for virtue and peace, 
the heavenly city anticipates something either greater than temporal success.  This does not, 
however, mean that those who ascribe their ultimate citizenship to the heavenly city do not bear 
a responsibility to secular society.  
 Murray concludes his analysis of GS by noting that a “work of systematization” of these 
themes remained to be done.172  It is this task to which I now turn.  While an overall synthesis of 
the church/state problematic cannot be completed here, the remainder of Chapter Two focuses up 
on Murray’s distinction between public and private morality in terms of proposed contraception 
legislation.  Such an analysis will provide the reader with a sense of how Murray thought the 
abovementioned systemization may be undertaken.  After the treatment of Murray, I will then 
take up the question of how Murray may have responded to the matter of legalized procured 
abortion in an effort to form a case study regarding Catholic approaches to this same matter in 
Chapter Three. 
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Murray on Contraception 
 After being directed by his Jesuit superior to cease writing about religious freedom in the 
late 1950s due to pressure from the Vatican’s Holy Office, Massachusetts Senator John F. 
Kennedy’s presidential campaign persuaded Murray, after conversations with the publisher of 
Sheed and Ward, to gather together a series of essays regarding the matter of religious pluralism 
in America.173 In this work, Murray sought to not only explain why Catholics ought not be object 
of suspicion when engaging in public affairs, particularly in elected office, but also to execute a 
great end-run around the Protestant establishment by making the case that Catholics were 
actually the group most suited to carry on the legacy of the Founding Generation.  Murray 
attempted to energize a generation of Catholics to contribute to public debate precisely because 
their faith provided them with a suitable entry point into the American Proposition itself.  Murray 
claimed: 
The point here is that Catholic participation in the American Consensus has been full and 
free, unreserved and unembarrassed, because the contents of this consensus – the ethical 
and political principles drawn from the tradition of natural law – approve themselves to 
the Catholic intelligence and conscience.  Where this kind of language is talked, the 
Catholic joins the conversation with complete ease.  It is his language.  The ideas 
expressed are native to his [sic] own universe of discourse.  Even the accent, being 
American, suits his tongue.174 
Murray makes this point emphatically because he realized how sensitive an argument he was 
making: not only did he argue for the desirability of Catholic participation in the American 
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nation, but, because of the epoch in which he wrote, Murray pinned the overall feasibility of 
Catholic participation in pluralistic democracy on its ability to cohere in the American context.  
This line of reasoning forms the kernel of Murray’s argument, because it suggests that, rather 
than being alien dwellers in a land of religious toleration and pluralism, Catholics actually bear 
the greatest chance of employing a political vocabulary intelligible to all participants in the 
national conversation.175  Moreover, if Catholics are able to function in this American context, it 
stands to reason that they may continue to do so elsewhere even if Catholicism is no longer 
protected by concordat or implied political preference.  
 Murray published WHTT before “Government and the Order of Religion,” but the 
former’s particularly American context marks it as more appropriate to be considered now.  
WHTT considers general ideas of religious freedom and the need for a public consensus – one 
that actually encourages debate, rather than cursory agreement.  It also defines the First 
Amendment as an “article of peace” and thus as a matter “not [of] true dogma but only good 
law.” 176 The First Amendment exists in order to protect the peace of civil society; it does not 
rise to the level “article of faith” which, being a dogmatic position, compels assent from the 
Christian.177 Murray believed the First Amendment to be good law precisely because it 
maintained peaceful conditions with the political context of America; at the same time, Murray 
did not admit the First Amendment to be an “article of faith” in and of itself, because to do so 
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would insert a “religious test…into the Constitution.”178  In plain terms, then, Murray claimed 
that the matter of belief in the universal non-desirability of the First Amendment was not 
necessary to be a good American, but rather only admission in the local context that this same 
Amendment served the common good in the American circumstance. Murray phrased things in 
this manner to protect himself against assertions of indifference in the religious sense, and of 
theocracy in the political sense.  The Catholic, Murray thus reasoned, may hope for a truly 
Catholic nation, but must be satisfied in the short term with his or her efforts in a pluralistic 
nation. Murray spends the last two-thirds of We Hold These Truths examining particular policy 
issues in this context.  “There seems to be sufficient reason for thinking that the American mind 
has never been clear about the relation between morals and law,” begins Murray’s argument in 
the second of his four “unfinished arguments” in We Hold These Truths, entitled “Should There 
Be a Law?”179  There are two ways in which this confusion manifests itself.  The first proceeds 
from the mistaken assumption that whatever is morally wrong should be subject to legal 
intervention.  Murray frames this as “the reformer’s constant shout: ‘There ought to be a 
law!’”180  Clarifying further, he describes this instinct as “[revealing] the failure to grasp the 
difference in order between moral and civil statutes.”181  Such a mistake, according to Murray, 
begets another: “If what is moral ought by that fact to be legal, it follows that what is legal is by 
that fact also moral.”182  The confusing of morality and law thus deprives both of their proper 
positions within civil society, and, as a result, robs each of their respective meanings.183   
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In order to illustrate the consequences of this confusion, Murray highlights the 
Connecticut birth control laws adopted in the 1870s.184  He classifies them as a “characteristic 
Comstockian-Protestant ignorance of the rules of traditional jurisprudence.”185  By this, Murray 
means that this law “transposes without further ado a private sin into a public crime.”186  The 
takeaway for Murray is that the inability to distinguish between legality and morality is nothing 
less than disastrous:  
The result is a fiasco of all morality.  From the foolish position that all sins ought be 
made crimes, it is only a step to the knavish position that, since certain acts (like the 
private use of contraceptives) are obviously not crimes, they are not even sins.  Upon a 
foolish disregard of the distinction between private and public morality there ensues a 
knavish denial that there is any such thing as public morality.187 
These reflections feed into Murray’s larger discussion regarding the general principles of 
censorship.  The intricacies of these matters do not concern us here, but the basic conclusions at 
which he arrives do.  These principles speak directly to the “issue of social freedom,” whereby 
one must “[strike] a right balance between freedom and constraint in society.”188 
 Murray sees a great danger in the “over-moralization” of the law: “men [sic] can be only 
coerced into a minimal amount of moral action.”189  This reality, however, does not mean that 
morality ought be absent from the public square.  Far from it!  Indeed, Murray unequivocally 
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believed that Catholics – like any members of a minority group – have the right to make their 
moral positions known.  Nevertheless, such groups may only “work toward the elevation of 
standards of public morality in the pluralist society, through the use of the methods of persuasion 
and pacific argument.”190 These same groups do not have “the right to impose [their] own 
religious or moral views on other groups, through the use of force, coercion, or violence.”191   It 
is also the prerogative of such a group, while exercising prudence and paying attention to the 
public consensus, to influence the “standards and content of public morality.”192  The distinction 
between public and private morality is thus construed as something largely determined by 
prudence,193 not only in weighing the possibility of successful passage of a piece of moral 
legislation, but also in the recognition about how certain efforts undertaken by the church may be 
perceived, marking it as either a “power-association” or begetting the “visage of the Church as 
God’s kingdom of truth and freedom, justice and love.”194 
 The value of Murray’s comments regarding the law and morality is that they distinguish 
between the proper attitudes toward public and private morality.  Legislating public morality, in 
accord with the public consensus (not necessarily the majority) is sometimes a necessary evil: 
doing so, however, ought be rare and its reach modest.  Formulating coercive law to engage 
citizens over matters of private morality is, however, a problematic overreaching.  To act this 
way in the public square may indeed bring about consequences previously unconsidered. In the 
final account, Murray proposes an honest epistemological approach to the legislation of morality 
and the church’s approach therein.  In a very real sense, such intellectual honesty provides 
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infrequent moralizers with more rhetorical power, since their forays into the border grounds 
between private and public morality will be rare.  Thus, interventions would, in and of 
themselves, highlight certain issues as graver than others.   
 In the 1960s the Massachusetts State Legislature considered legislation that would 
decriminalize the sale, mailing, and supplying of artificial contraception.  Cardinal Richard 
Cushing of Boston contacted Murray to ask for advice regarding the Catholic Church’s official 
response to such a repeal.195  It should be noted at the outset that Cushing accepted Murray’s 
recommendations.   
Murray began his response to Cushing by stating, “Catholics may and should approve 
[the contraception] amendment.”196  Murray arrived at these conclusions for two specific 
reasons: namely the “differential character of law and morality and on the distinction between 
public and private morality,” and “the concept of religious freedom.”197 The first of these 
arguments is reminiscent of many of Murray’s arguments in We Hold These Truths.  In the 
memo to Cushing, Murray opines “It is not the function of civil law to prescribe everything that 
is morally right and to forbid everything that is morally wrong…the scope of law is limited to the 
maintenance and protection of public morality. Matters of private morality lie beyond the scope 
of law; they are left to personal conscience.”198  Issues of public morality are restricted to those 
which “seriously [undermine] the foundations of society or gravely [damage] the moral life of 
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the community as such.”199  It is in these situations, Murray continues, that positive law is 
required to be written and employed, precisely because an overarching law is needed to protect 
the common good.200  Theologically speaking, Murray seems to anticipate a key passage in DH: 
“In availing of any freedom men must respect the moral principle of personal and social 
responsibility.”201  At the same time, “civil society has the right to protect itself against possible 
abuses committed in the name of religious freedom the responsibility of providing such 
protection rests especially with the civil authority.”202  Moreover, “All these matters are basic to 
the common good and belong to what is called the public order.”203  DH §7 concludes, “man’s 
freedom should be given the fullest possible recognition and should not be curtailed except when 
and in so far as is necessary.”204  This is the bind in which Murray found himself – and one out 
of which Catholic politicians have not yet escaped today: DH recognized both that “respect for 
the dignity of the human person in no way depends on whether or not the person’s beliefs or 
actions are in accord with religious or moral truth,” while still opining that “the exercise of 
responsible freedom is, indeed, oriented toward the truth.”205 
 The appropriate situations in which legislation ought be enacted to enforce public 
morality further narrow the scope for such action. Murray reasoned that the effectiveness of 
coercive law vis-à-vis morality is so low that the very unlikelihood of its success ought make 
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society loathe to employ it.206  Indeed, since the American Proposition itself is founded on a 
certain amount of personal freedom, Murray invoked what he called the jurisprudential principle: 
“As much freedom as possible, as much restriction and coercion as necessary.”207  This principle, 
it ought be noted, is grounded in the need to protect human dignity as a matter of natural law, 
and thus is embedded with the American Proposition itself. This axiom, however, is not invoked 
without serious consideration.  Murray continues: 
Again, by reason of the function of law, there must be a reasonable correspondence 
between the moral standards generally recognized by the conscience of the community 
and the legal status concerning public morality.  Otherwise laws will be unenforceable 
and ineffective and they will be resented as undue restrictions on civil or personal 
freedom.208 
 The above caveat to Murray’s freedom/restriction axiom is instructive: there are times when 
immoral conduct ought not be subject to restrictive legislation, precisely because those subject to 
the legislation do not possess the moral standards to attempt to follow the law in good faith.   
 Murray argues that it is neither because of contraception’s widespread use, nor its general 
acceptance by the public, that the Church ought not stand in the way of the contraception 
amendment.  Rather, it is the widespread acceptance of contraception by other religious 
communities that bears heavily upon the situation.  Indeed, “it is difficult to see how the state can 
forbid, as contrary to public morality, a practice that numerous religious leaders approve as 
morally right.”209 Murray opines that even if contraception is considered an issue of public 
morality since it possesses “public consequences,” it still cannot be adequately “controlled by 
                                                
206 John Courtney Murray, “Memo to Cardinal Cushing,” 83. 
207 Ibid., 82.  
208 Ibid., 83.  
209 Ibid. 
Janeczko || 60 
law.” Consequently, in the second half of his memo, Murray builds his argument upon the “right 
of moral judgment on the legal order and its statutes,” as exercised by the Church in a negative 
sense.  That is to say, the Church may note the immorality of laws, but does not normatively 
make positive judgments upon the morality of legislation.210 
 Murray summarizes his memo to Cushing by outlining two important distinctions that 
Catholics should make:  First, “Catholics maintain contraception to be morally wrong;” 
secondly:  
Out of their understanding of the distinction between morality and law and between 
public and private morality, and out of their understanding of religious freedom, 
Catholics repudiate a resort to the coercive instrument of the law to enforce upon the 
whole community moral standards that the community itself does not commonly 
accept.211  In the absence of legal coercion, Murray suggests that Catholics attempt to lift 
standards of public morality themselves through “the integrity of their Christian lives.”212 
The practical application of Murray’s philosophy regarding public and private morality is found 
within his memo to Cardinal Cushing.  He articulates the jurisprudential principle of maximizing 
freedom, while minimizing coercion.  At the same time, Murray draws a practical distinction 
between public and private morality, recognizing that the bellwethers for public morality – 
religious communities – heavily bear upon the public credibility of moral legislation.  Murray 
concludes that since morals legislation may often backfire, it is incumbent upon the Christian 
community to live lives worthy of moral witness; moreover, it may be further deduced that part 
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of this witness comes from articulating a coherent public philosophy for both matters of public 
and private morality in the public square.  
 
Segers and Whitmore: Extrapolating Murray 
 In an essay published in 1996, Joseph Komonchok questioned those who took issue with 
John Courtney Murray’s attempts to construct a public philosophy.  He noted: 
many criticize [Murray’s] choice to undertake construction of a public philosophy in [a] 
general essay of a methodological nature, without much effort to show how their own 
views translate into a relevant and effective public theology that permits genuine civil 
conversation and cooperation with believes and non-believers.213  
Komonchok challenged detractors of Murray’s principles to move beyond a diagnosis of his 
short-comings and propose a “publicly available and relevant solution” to contemporary matters 
of public policy.214  In response to his own challenge, Komonchok suggests that “instructive 
lessons” might be gathered from “essays that deal with Murray’s method and the question of 
abortion today.”215  Taking Komonchok at this word, we now turn our attention to the essays of 
Mary Segers and Todd Whitmore. 
 Mary Segers attempts to develop sound public policy for Catholics who wish to 
publically engage the topic of abortion.  Segers asserts that “undoubtedly Murray would have 
been challenged profoundly by the abortion issue, since it, perhaps more than any other 
contemporary issue, poses fundamental questions about his view of an American public 
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philosophy based on rational deliberation and consensus.”216  In order to draw tentative 
conclusions as to how Murray may have responded, Segers proposes Murray’s writings on 
contraception as the prime analogue.217 Segers first hones in on Murray’s contention that 
sinfulness and legality are not equivalent in the public square, as well as upon his assertion that 
legal permissibility does not make an act morally appropriate.  Segers praises Murray because 
his philosophy “created space for groups such as Catholics to respect their Church’s teachings 
against artificial contraception and yet refuse to impose through civil law that conviction of 
private morality on non-Catholic Americans.”218  What is more, Murray understood “public 
policy must meet at least minimal standards of consent in order to be enforceable.”219  These 
understandings received further clarification through Murray’s articulation of the difference 
between matters of public and private morality in his memorandum to Cardinal Cushing. This 
distinction provides a method to project a possible response of Murray to legalized abortion. 
 Without a doubt, Segers writes, Murray would have “[defended] the right of the Roman 
Catholic Church and other churches to address the moral dimensions of public policy officially 
and to contribute to the public debate about the morality and legality of abortion.”220  The goal of 
these efforts, in Murray’s mind, would be for an “agreement about what is right and just...from 
rational deliberation about public affairs.”221  At the same time, Catholic attempts to engage in 
this deliberation would be best phrased “in the language of reason and natural law, not in the 
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language of biblical ethics or Gospel norms.”222   Consequently, Segers reasons that “if Catholic 
Church officials wish to shape public consensus on abortion policy, they can only do so through 
appeals to reason in the language of secular, nontheistic ethics.”223  Given this preliminary work, 
Segers identifies two questions that may be put to Murray: “(1) Were Murray with us today, 
would he favor the use of coercive law to prohibit or severely restrict abortion and (2) How 
might he advise American Catholics to approach the question of abortion policy in the United 
States?”224  Segers responds to these two questions with direct answers.  The first pertains to the 
matter of whether abortion is a matter of public or private morality.  More specifically, she notes 
that “if the fetus is defined as a human being from conception … abortion is a public issue, a 
matter of public morality, because it affects another party, a human being who cannot be 
consulted but whose interests deserve protection as a matter of justice.” 225  Segers notes that the 
Declaration on Procured Abortion confirms the absolute sanctity of life not because it is 
certainly life, but because it is either life or may reasonably be thought to be life.  This difference 
is important to Segers because she uses it to consider abortion in terms of its risks to possible 
human life, rather than as direct destruction of human life.226   
 Segers continues her reflections by noting that Catholicism’s complete prohibition of 
abortion places it in the clear minority of public opinion.  Correspondingly, she supposes that 
Murray would be “loath to use the force of coercive law to impose a distinctly minority view on 
the citizenry.”227  Murray may have originally hoped for a public consensus to develop in a 
situation such as this one, but since this has not been achieved Segers argues that “middle-ground 
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positions” may be the next best thing.  Of course, in light of Catholic teaching, many of these 
compromises are unacceptable.  For instance, she considers “abortions in the difficult 
circumstances of rape, incest, [and] fetal deformity.”228  Segers also reflects upon the argument 
of the woman’s autonomy in making the decision to carry the fetus to term.  Drawing upon 
Murray’s bifurcation between public and private morality, Segers offers a three-fold comparison 
between contraception in the 1960s and abortion in the 90s: both practices are widespread; many 
do not consider the practice in question morally wrong; and many religious groups find neither 
contraception nor abortion (to varying degrees) unacceptable.  These similarities, allow Segers 
ask Murray “whether restrictive laws against abortion would unjustifiably restrain the religious 
freedom of other non-Catholic Americans.”229  Segers answers this question in the affirmative, 
and then shifts to another inquiry: “If it would be imprudent and possibly intolerant for the 
American Catholic Church to use to the coercive power of the law to enforce its moral teaching 
against abortion, what role might it appropriately play in the abortion controversy?”230 Segers 
posits that “[were] Murray alive today I think he would stress the Church’s positive role in 
society rather than its political role in shaping a more restrictive abortion policy.”231  In the final 
account, Segers reasons that Murray would have both “stressed legal efficacy and enforceability 
in approaching the question of legislating morality … [because] he was respectful of religious 
liberty and tolerant of religious differences in a free society.”232 
Mary Segers rests the burden of her argument upon two factors: the accuracy of her 
analogy between contraception legislation in the 1960s and abortion in the present time, and the 
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alleged uncertain status of the unborn fetus which may, in fact, suggest that abortion is a matter 
of private morality. As such, she believes that John Courtney Murray would have erred on the 
side of caution when it came to this matter.  She further believes that Murray would have 
counseled against legislating moral conduct from the position of a religious minority.  As we will 
see, using roughly the same approach, Todd Whitmore presents a contrasting position.  
In an article published a year after Segers’ essay, Todd David Whitmore took to the pages 
of Commonweal to ask: “How is one to enter into dialogue in a pluralistic society while 
remaining true to one’s own religious or moral tradition?”233  Similarly to Segers, Whitmore 
attempts to use Murray’s work regarding contraception as a means of projecting what Murray 
might have said about Catholic approaches to public policy and abortion.  Whitmore departs 
from the conclusions reached by Segers in several important ways.  First and foremost, 
Whitmore suggests that Segers misread Murray’s definition of consensus.  It is not – as Segers 
claims – a matter of public opinion.  Whitmore cites chapter four of We Hold These Truths, 
recalling, “The validity of the consensus is radically independent of its possible status as either 
majority or minority opinion.”234  Such an assertion, Whitmore claims, is based on a realist 
epistemology wherein “moral truths are grounded in the structure of reality itself.”235  As a 
consequence of this worldview, the opinions held by the majority of political leaders are not the 
sole indicators of the rightness or wrongness of the matter.236 Whitmore, recalling these 
epistemological bases, presents a tightly woven argument that, for the sake of clarity, ought to be 
quoted in full:  
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Murray’s realist epistemology is of particular import for the issue of abortion. If it is 
descriptively true, as official Catholic teachings say, that the embryo-fetus is, in all 
probability, a human person, then the presumption must be that it is also morally true that 
one ought not take a life.  Moreover, if the embryo-fetus is in all probability a person, 
then the presumption must also be that abortion is a matter of public morality: a human 
life is at stake.  Finally, if the embryo-fetus is in all probability a person, then taking its 
life would not be a matter of religious liberty.  Religious freedom has limits.237   
These three points cut to the heart of Whitmore’s argument, providing a compelling case for the 
status of abortion as a matter of public morality – if!  If, of course, one accepts the teaching of 
the Catholic Church that from the moment of conception the fetus is human life; or, failing that, 
one admits that the likelihood of the existence of human life in the womb at one point or another 
makes this matter a subject of public morality.  The latter argument, of course, allows for a more 
nuanced debate and involves gradations of moral judgment that exist outside the direct scope of 
this paper.  
Whitmore’s line of reasoning creates three requirements for constructing a “Murray 
argument” regarding public policy and abortion: (1) Catholic teaching regarding abortion is true, 
(2) abortion is thus a matter of public morality, and, as a consequences of this, (3) laws 
restricting abortion are appropriate.238 From here, Whitmore engages Segers’ discussion 
regarding the difficulty of legislating morality.  Again, there exists a difference of opinion, 
because for Whitmore, though “the presumption is that matters of public morality should be 
addressed by the law, the relationship between the two is not a one-to-one correspondence.”239 
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He continues, “The public may not be ready to receive a law that simply mirrors what is morally 
true.”  In this sense, Whitmore faithfully interprets Murray, whose suggested hesitation in 
legislating public morality is based itself largely in the reality that such efforts were not, simply 
put, effective.  Whitmore’s diagnosis also makes plain that the two most vociferous sides of the 
abortion debate have digressed from Murray’s outline for public debate.  “One side claims that 
(objective) morality ought to be translated directly into law,” Whitmore writes, “while the other 
side counters that (private) morality and law are utterly separate.240  The solution for Whitmore, 
in this case, is different from Segers, but, in his own mind, equally clear: “the two [morality and 
law] need to be brought closer together; that is, law must be brought closer to objective morality 
if the two are to remain in relationship.241  Whitmore explains that simply changing laws will be 
ineffective, since it will only breed contempt as abortions rights are curbed. At the same time, to 
sit idly abdicates the responsibility Catholics possess to provide public witness of their faith – 
especially when matters of public morality affect a certain voiceless population.  In order to do 
this, Catholics “need to help shape public opinion so as to reduce the distance between American 
law and Catholic teaching on abortion. Law itself is a bad vehicle for this.”242   
Segers and Whitmore concur on the need for the Church itself to provide a clearer 
witness to Christian praxis (beyond repetition of belief).  Nevertheless, Whitmore moves past 
Segers’ position by arguing “from the perspective of a tradition that seeks to keep law and 
morality related, aiding woman is not an alternative to law; [such aid] is, among other things, the 
concrete precondition for bringing morality and law closer together.”243  In other words, 
Whitmore believes that solely using legislation to be an insufficient remedy to the matter of 
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abortion: rather, Christian action is also necessary.  Whitmore’s suggestion, though closer (at 
least in my opinion) to a more faithful reading of Murray, cannot prescribe specific legal and 
moral goals – and he admits as much.  He leaves two important questions for further discussion 
on this topic: “In comparison to the laws in place, does it move in the direction of a greater 
harmony between Catholic teaching on objective morality on one hand, and law, on the other? 
Have we as a church been successful in helping to shape a society where a more restrictive law is 
plausible?”244  In the final section of this paper, I will make an attempt at providing more specific 
suggestions as to how Catholics may answer these two questions by being authentic to their own 
tradition while also arguing in a manner intelligible to our pluralistic society.   
 
Conclusion  
This chapter began by examining elements of John Courtney Murray’s work regarding 
the relationship between the church and state.  It first took up a representative example of 
Murray’s pre-conciliar work in which he analyzed Leo XIII’s writings on the Church/state 
relationship and attempted to distill a series of principles to be applied to this dynamic, as well as 
questions that could serve the heuristic task of determining how Catholics ought to approach 
topics that sit at the crossroads of public and private morality.  Next, I analyzed Murray’s 
approach to Gaudium et Spes, seeking to better understand the manner in which he developed the 
church/state problematic.  Murray saw definite theological progress here, since the document 
took seriously the need for Christian participation in the secular realm.  Despite this positive 
development, Murray critiqued GS because it did not fully recognize its historical situation: 
religious pluralism had not only become commonplace, but it had also become the preferred 
                                                
244 Ibid. 
Janeczko || 69 
political model.  Murray recognized that in GS the Church began to recognize this reality, he did 
not believe the document clearly understood that such political shifts were normative – and that 
such a change was positive. Subsequently, I turned my attention to the work Murray did in We 
Hold These Truths regarding the distinction between public and private morality and how this 
manifested itself in Murray’s treatment of the Church’s public stance regarding contraception.  
Finally, I examined the work of Todd David Whitmore and Mary Segers. Whitmore and Segers 
speculate as to how Murray would have configured a Catholic response to attempts to legalize 
procured abortion. 
Chapter One concluded with a question regarding the proper action of the Church within 
the overarching political environment of the State vis-à-vis Murray’s influence and thought.  
This second chapter recognized a twin development of the problematic: the first involves the 
development of Catholic doctrine regarding the matters of freedom and proper action within the 
state; the second is more localized: the difficulty in legislating matters of public morality in a 
pluralistic state.  The analysis provided of these two intertwined issues points toward Murray’s 
brilliant turn of the phrase in the essay he wrote regarding GS and DH: “the Church may neither 
be enclosed within the political order nor be denied her own mode of spiritual entrance into the 
political order.”245 Murray argued that the role of the Church in the world was to “signify and 
safeguard the transcendence of the human person [and] likewise to signify and further the unity 
of the human family.”246  With this in mind, it is now appropriate to turn to actual examples of 
how Catholics involved in public debate regarding abortion have attempted to both safeguard the 
rights of the individual while at the same time promoting and protecting unity in a pluralistic 
state.  As we will see, these two values are often competing and emphasis on one often comes at 
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the expense of the other.  The success of Chapter Three, then, will not come in finding a proper 
balance of individual and communal interests, but rather in noting the points of emphasis in each 
argument examined.  Such an analysis will lead to some considerations as to how a new 
“Catholic” moment may be achieved. 
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Chapter 3: Catholic Voices in the Public Square 
Introduction 
The analysis provided by Chapter Three concludes the majority of the work set out in the 
Introduction. The individual analyses provided herein are not exhaustive in any sense of the 
word.  Rather, the material contained in this chapter ought to be considered the first step in 
appropriating the work of John Courtney Murray in such a manner as to lay the groundwork for a 
new “Catholic moment.”  Each of the three figures reviewed in this chapter engaged the matters 
of public philosophy about which Murray wrote, though they did not do so in altogether similar 
ways. The appropriation of the ideas of Murray – implicitly or explicitly – is not a simple task, 
because Murray provided philosophical entry points into thinking about the position of Catholics 
in the public square, but not specific policy recommendations. Indeed, my review of the work of 
Segers and Whitmore in the last chapter should highlight this reality.  Both authors claimed to 
speculate what Murray’s position on procured abortion would have been using his own words, 
yet their conclusions differed in significant respects.   
The following pages will examine and analyze comments made by John F. Kennedy, 
Mario Cuomo and Henry Hyde, seeking out the influence of Murray in their words.  The goal is 
to chart a course through Catholic sectarianism and religious indifferentism, searching for clues 
as to how Bernardin’s wish for a “new moment” in Catholic thought may be achieved.  The 
conclusion of this chapter will point out areas of both synthesis and discontinuity among these 
three Catholic politicians.  The goal here is not to place each entry into congruous harmony with 
one another, but rather to illuminate the richness of the Catholic discussion regarding the 
Church’s place within secular political discourse.  The conclusion of this chapter will take up the 
final task of attempting to point out a few paths that may be pursued in the future: in other words, 
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while the majority of this work has been engaged in a diagnostic task of sorts, the conclusion will 
prescribe the beginnings of some possible paths forward. 
 
Senator John F. Kennedy: The Candidate  
 In 1960, then-Senator and Democratic nominee for President, John F. Kennedy of 
Massachusetts delivered what many considered to be the defining speech for Catholics who 
wished to run for offices with national influence.247  While the brief speech ran just over eleven 
minutes, Kennedy’s remarks fundamentally changed the manner in which Americans were to 
interpret the religious beliefs of their political leaders.  Or, if perhaps this reaches too far, then at 
the very least, it must be admitted that Kennedy, whether he knew it or not, articulated an 
enduring paradigm for the manner in which one’s religious views could be presented in the 
public square.  Kennedy, a Catholic locked in a tight race with the Republican nominee Richard 
Nixon, believed he needed to clearly demarcate the role his Catholic faith would play in a 
presumptive Kennedy White House.  Kennedy drew upon his legislative record in the Senate to 
make this point, and then some.  The speech appears to have been a success: Kennedy defeated 
Nixon and entered the White House as the first Catholic president, largely relegating the 
previous Catholic nominee, Al Smith of New York in 1928, to the status of a historical 
footnote.248  Of course, the extent to which Kennedy’s speech affected his ultimate victory is 
open to debate.  Nevertheless, the historical memory of the nation recalls this speech as a 
watershed moment in the history of American politics and religion.249 In the same nation that had 
made Paul Blanchard’s anti-Catholic screed, American Freedom and Catholic Power, a best-
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seller just a few years earlier, Kennedy won the presidency by one of the closest margins in 
American political history.250  Kennedy’s speech before the Houston Ministerial Association 
described a manner of living one’s faith in the public square that minimized the importance of 
individual faith by positing that this same faith ought bear little upon the public policy decisions 
one made. 
 John Kennedy framed his speech to Baptists ministers as one that he would rather not 
give.  Throughout his remarks, Kennedy continually returned to the point that his Catholicism, at 
least in his own mind, should not distinctly mark his candidacy.  And, if it did, that would be a 
function of the voters’ and pundits’ rejection of American values.  In order to make this point 
more clearly, he spoke in strong terms regarding his view on the separation between Church and 
state:  
I believe in an America where the separation of church and state is absolute--where no 
Catholic prelate would tell the President (should he be Catholic) how to act, and no 
Protestant minister would tell his parishioners for whom to vote--where no church or 
church school is granted any public funds or political preference--and where no man is 
denied public office merely because his religion differs from the President who might 
appoint him or the people who might elect him.251 
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In order to justify his emphasis upon the wall of separation – in the strictest sense – Kennedy 
directly referred to Virginia’s harassment of “Baptist preachers” and Thomas Jefferson’s 
subsequent articulation of religious freedom.252  
 Having first elucidated this logic, Kennedy continued to lay out the practical implications 
of religious discrimination.  Herein is the true genius of Kennedy’s remarks: he described a 
scenario in which his religious beliefs should not disqualify him from a particular office 
precisely because these beliefs themselves would not affect his governance. Kennedy illustrated 
his belief that religion is purely a matter of private choice and, consequently, immaterial in 
consideration of political action.  If, however, the religion/private, government/public bifurcation 
was breached, Kennedy warned, “Today I may be the victim- -but tomorrow it may be you--until 
the whole fabric of our harmonious society is ripped at a time of great national peril.”253  
Kennedy continued, “I believe in a President whose religious views are his own private affair, 
neither imposed by him upon the nation or imposed by the nation upon him as a condition to 
holding that office.”254  This is the fundamental supposition Kennedy proposed for the role of 
religion in public. Kennedy’s speech made a particular point in reference to Catholics in the 
public square: the Pope would not offer the final word on matters of domestic or foreign policy.  
Kennedy emphasized this point: 
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I believe in an America where religious intolerance will someday end--where all men 
and all churches are treated as equal--where every man has the same right to attend or not 
attend the church of his choice--where there is no Catholic vote, no anti-Catholic vote, no 
bloc voting of any kind--and where Catholics, Protestants and Jews, at both the lay and 
pastoral level, will refrain from those attitudes of disdain and division which have so 
often marred their works in the past, and promote instead the American ideal of 
brotherhood.255 
These sorts of statement made by Kennedy did not refer to religious beliefs as such.  They 
actually spoke directly to the very nature of Catholic participation in the public square. 
Kennedy believed his Catholicism compelled him to speak directly to how he had, as a 
member of the Senate, voted against what could be typically considered Catholic interests.  A 
caveat, however, is necessary here: these particular issues do not correspond to “Catholic issues” 
in contemporary terms.  Looking back, there is some irony about the issues Kennedy used to 
proclaim his independence from Church authority.  Those he cited are ones that may be 
considered, at least today, somewhat tame in nature, relative to current debates over same-sex 
marriage and abortion: “I ask you tonight to follow in that tradition--to judge me on the basis of 
my record of 14 years in Congress--on my declared stands against an Ambassador to the Vatican, 
against unconstitutional aid to parochial schools, and against any boycott of the public schools 
(which I have attended myself).”256 
As he continued his speech, Kennedy pushed further. Speculating as to how his 
administration might respond to one issue or another, the candidate claimed that 
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Whatever issue may come before me as President--on birth control, divorce, censorship, 
gambling or any other subject--I will make my decision in accordance with these views, 
in accordance with what my conscience tells me to be the national interest, and without 
regard to outside religious pressures or dictates. And no power or threat of punishment 
could cause me to decide otherwise.257 
Again, to our contemporary ears such a statement may not strike a discordant note.  What is 
fascinating, however, is Kennedy’s citation of a document published by the United State Bishops 
in 1948 that he believed supported his views.258  In reference to this document, Kennedy 
remarked that “the statement of the American Bishops in 1948 which strongly endorsed church-
state separation, and which more nearly reflects the views of almost every American Catholic” in 
fact coincided with his own position.259  This matter, as a full reading of the document in 
question suggests, was not as simple as Kennedy wanted his audience to think.  In fact, the 
statement issued by the bishops reprinted in the New York Times bore the title “Statement by 
Catholic Bishops Attacking Secularism as an Evil”: hardly a ringing endorsement for a higher 
wall of separation.  The statement began: “Human life is centered in God.  The failure to center 
life in God is secularism – which, as we pointed out last year, is the most deadly menace to our 
Christian and American way of living.”260  
The 1948 statement of the bishops attended to issues such as “religion in the home,” 
“religion in education,” and “religion in economic life.”261  Turning their attention to the link 
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between religion and the duties of citizens, the bishops sounded an Augustinian note, writing that 
“our history reveals the same fundamental connection between religion and citizenship.  It is 
through law that the government exercises control over its citizens for the common good and 
establishes a balance between their rights and their duties.”262  The bishops continued their social 
analysis by reading the First Amendment in a different manner than did Kennedy:  
Under the First Amendment, the Federal Government could not extend this type of 
preferential treatment to one religion as against another, nor could it compel or forbid any 
state to do so…it would be an utter distortion of American history and law to make that 
practical policy involve the indifference to religion and the exclusion of cooperation 
between religion and government implied in the term “separation of Church and State” as 
it has become the shibboleth of doctrinaire secularism.”263 
What, then, are we to make of Kennedy’s reference to the statement?  The bishops, for their part, 
concluded that the Establishment Clause existed not to exclude religious belief from the public 
square, but to prevent the government from specifically privileging individual denominations.   
 The portion of the statement to which Kennedy referred, as best as one may determine, 
likely comes at its conclusion.  There, the bishops, in reflecting upon the actual situation in the 
country, and the role that the church could play in it, stated “with deep conviction for the sake of 
both good citizenship and religion there should be a reaffirmation of our original American 
tradition of free cooperation between government and religious bodies – cooperation involving 
no special privilege to any group and no restriction on the religious liberty of any citizen.”264  
The bishops then concluded: “We call upon our Catholic people to seek in their faith an 
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inspiration and guide in making an informed contribution to good citizenship.”265  The fact that 
Kennedy himself cited this document (apparently loosely), underlies the difficult situation in 
which the candidate found himself.  Scrambling to assuage suspicions regarding his religious 
beliefs, Kennedy relied upon a document that, in and of itself, would likely have done little to 
allay these fears.  Nevertheless, the document did give Kennedy enough rhetorical room to make 
the case that the American Catholic Church encouraged its citizens to engage in activities that 
supported the common good of the nation, not simply proselytization.  
Kennedy concluded his speech with two other statements of note.  He promised his 
audience that if he were presented with a situation that compelled him to violate his conscience 
or the national interest, he would resign.266 He also pledged that if he won the presidency, he 
could take the oath of office without hesitation.267  In a move that is as rhetorically powerful as it 
is theologically puzzling, Kennedy then read the oath of office itself, seemingly pausing for 
emphasis on the last phrase, “so help me God.”268  Here again one finds a distinctive partition in 
Kennedy’s logic: he appeared, on one hand, to be at pains to promise that his Catholic beliefs 
would not explicitly or implicitly affect his political decisions.  On the other hand, Kennedy not 
only placed a heavy emphasis upon the effect that his conscience would have on his ability to 
even undertake the presidential office; he also emphasized his duty before God in discharging the 
presidency.  It seems as if Kennedy sought a type of both/and route to political expediency.  In 
achieving this, he worked a masterstroke that set the tone for Catholics in politics in the coming 
generations. Kennedy acknowledged the overall effect that religious belief has upon a person in a 
position of power, but also sought to minimize the ability of that same belief to compel the same 
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person to act in one way or another. Kennedy’s speech attempted to indicate that the teachings of 
the Church could be separated from the individual practice of Catholicism. Kennedy laid claim 
to the basic religion notion of “God” as guiding the discharge of his political duties, while 
maintaining political independence from the church proper. 
 
Cuomo and Hyde: Belief, Morality and the Place of Religious Values in America 
 The speeches given by Mario Cuomo and Henry Hyde, respectively, in 1984, are 
significantly longer than the previously examined one delivered by Kennedy.  Consequently, I 
will avoid providing an extended summary of both sets of remarks, and rather focus on a few 
pertinent matters that show places of continuity and discontinuity with the Catholic tradition as 
previously formulated in Chapter One.  
 In his remarks titled “Religious Belief and Public Morality: A Catholic Governor’s 
Perspective,” Mario Cuomo set out a series of questions which he believed required answers in 
reference to his position as an American Catholic politician.  Using the overarching theme of 
“loyalty” – in reference to both his religious beliefs and political duties as he construed them -  
Cuomo asked a series of questions:  
Specifically, must politics and religion in America divide our loyalties? Does the 
"separation between church and state" imply separation between religion and politics? 
Between morality and government? Are these different propositions? Even more 
specifically, what is the relationship of my Catholicism to my politics? Where does the 
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one end and other begin? Or are the two divided at all? And if they're not, should they 
be?269 
Cuomo sought to answer these questions through the prism of his “special responsibility” as an 
elected official.270 Though Catholic, he pledged to serve members of all faiths, even those who 
do not profess any faith at all.  The goal of the politician in Cuomo’s estimation was to “create 
conditions under which all can live with a maximum amount of dignity and with a reasonable 
degree of freedom.”271  Specifically, the Catholic politician – precisely because he or she 
presides over and within a pluralist democracy – ought uphold the situation “where everyone 
who chooses may hold beliefs different from specifically Catholic ones – sometimes 
contradictory to them: where the laws protect people’s rights to divorce, to use birth control and 
even to choose abortion.”272  Cuomo explained that the obligation to protect the freedom to let 
citizens choose wrongly is one that guarantees “freedom for all, [and so] guarantee[s] our right to 
be Catholics: our right to pray, to use the sacraments, to refuse birth control devices, to reject 
abortion, not to divorce and remarry if we believe it to be wrong.”273  Though Cuomo does not 
cite Murray directly, he seems to draw upon the sentiments encapsulated by the jurisprudential 
principle: provide citizens with the most freedom possible, with the least restriction necessary.274 
In Cuomo’s line of reasoning, the state’s decision to not restrict certain activities through law 
simultaneously provided religious persons the ability to refuse to engage in the same activities 
because of their beliefs.  
                                                
269 Mario Cuomo, “Religious Belief and Public Morality: A Catholic Governor’s Perspective,” 






274 John Courtney Murray, “Memo to Cardinal Cushing on Contraception Legislation,” 82.   
Janeczko || 81 
 After describing the practical realities of the jurisprudential principle, Cuomo described 
the Non-Establishment Clause as protecting the church from the politics of others, while at the 
same time, allowing one to use his or her religious values as the basis for broader policy:  
Thus, the same amendment of the Constitution that forbids the establishment of a State 
Church affirms my legal right to argue that my religious belief would serve well as an 
article of our universal public morality. I may use the prescribed processes of government 
-- the legislative and executive and judicial processes -- to convince my fellow citizens -- 
Jews and Protestants and Buddhists and non-believers -- that what I propose is as 
beneficial for them as I believe it is for me; that it is not just parochial or narrowly 
sectarian but fulfills a human desire for order, peace, justice, kindness, love, any of the 
values most of us agree are desirable even apart from their specific religious base or 
context.275 
When there is a failure, however, to convince the majority of the population of the desirability of 
the transfer of one’s religious values into that of law, one ought take a “hands-off” approach.  
Cuomo thus defines public morality as that which is developed from a “consensus view of right 
and wrong.”276  Correspondingly, “values derived from religious belief” need not be accepted 
solely on their religious origin; at the same time, they do not deserve to be rejected for this 
precise reason either.277  Cuomo developed this idea by recognizing that the American consensus 
“reflects to some extent religious values of a great majority of Americans,” but that, at the same 
time, “religiously based values don’t have an a priori place in our public morality.”278  He thus 
argued that “the community must decide if what is being proposed would be better left to private 
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discretion than public policy; whether it restricts freedoms, and if so to what end, to whose 
benefit; whether it will produce a good or bad result; whether overall it will help the community 
or merely divide it.”279   
Cuomo’s articulation of consensus contrasts with the position explicated by Murray 
throughout We Hold These Truths.  Cuomo defines the idea of the consensus as rooted in the 
prevailing opinion of the majority.  Moreover, Cuomo indicates that in those situations where 
there is no clear majority, politicians ought err on the side of freedom, rather than restriction.  
What makes Cuomo’s position so hard to parse, then, at least in the terms of his concurrence 
with Murray, is that the first half of his argument Murray would have rejected, yet the latter half 
likely accepted.  Let me explain further: in the introduction to WHTT, Murray wrote that the very 
struggle of reaching a consensus formed an otherwise disparate society in “a people.”280  This 
consensus, however, is not rooted in “secondary rationalizations,” nor in “the residual minimum 
left” after all matters upon which there are disagreements have been excised.281  The consensus is 
exists when the public collectively agrees that there are certain truths that must be held in order 
for individuals or groups to consider themselves actual members of a certain society.   
Murray roots the particular American consensus in the notion that there are, in fact, 
certain truths that form the bedrock of American civil and political life.282 Because of the 
consensus’ importance, it must always be the subject of debate, so that its articulation of the truth 
is constantly refined.  This same consensus is to be held by all involved in society because it is, 
in and of itself, true.283  Neither experience (as interpreted by the majority) nor reduction of the 
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consensus to the lowest common denominator is the correct application of this principle.  
Instead, the consensus is reached by a “conspiracy,” defined by Murray in terms of disparate 
members of society breathing together.284  Murray’s view of consensus thus diverges from the 
one proposed by Cuomo in a significant manner.  While Murray would approve of Cuomo’s 
reticence to legislate individual matters of morality upon which there was no consensus, he 
would disapprove of Cuomo’s more general treatment of the consensus itself.  Murray, I believe, 
would advise Cuomo to use his own political position to shape the consensus toward a fuller 
embrace of what is generally true, as well as in more particular matters, for instance, in the case 
of abortion.  With this distinction in mind, I turn now to an overview of the application of his 
logic to the particular issue of legalized procured abortion.  
 In speaking about legalized abortion, Cuomo portrayed the matter as a question of public 
morality which lacks public consensus.  Though Cuomo admitted “even a radically secular world 
must struggle with the questions of when life begins,” he explicates his own position as being 
one that is fundamentally unenviable: his Catholic faith prescribes a position against abortion 
(one with which he professed agreement), but at the same time he bears a larger responsibility 
because he “[defines] policies that determine other people’s rights in these same areas.”285 He 
thus viewed the legalization of abortion, though a matter of public morality, as also calling for 
“prudential political judgment.”286  This means that, at least in Cuomo’s mind, while he is under 
certain religious obligations, his “church does not order [him] – under pain of sin and expulsion 
– to pursue [its] salvific mission according to a precisely defined political plan.”287  Cuomo 
subsequently built upon the precise role of the bishops in this matter, suggesting that they ought 
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be “teachers not pollsters.”288  Cuomo offers a helpful nuance in this matter: religion ought not 
change its teachings based upon the prevailing opinions in a pluralistic society.  At the same 
time, of course, religion cannot expect its minority opinion to be legislated simply because it is 
religious.  Implied in this position, then, is the assertion that if Catholics qua Catholics did a 
more effective job of convincing society as a whole of the correctness of Catholic moral 
teachings, Catholic politicians could then act more concretely in the legislative square.  In the 
current situation, Cuomo, aware of Catholic moral teaching, suggests that the politician must 
make a prudential judgment regarding the application of these same principles.  In other words, 
“Church teaching on … abortion is clear.  But in the application of those teachings…there was 
and is no one, clear, absolute route that the Church says, as a matter of doctrine, we must 
follow.”289  Therefore, Cuomo believed himself to be on solid ground on two fronts: he thought it 
within his rights as a Catholic politician to conclude that “legal interdicting of abortion by either 
the federal government or the individual states is not a plausible possibility and even if it could 
be obtained, it wouldn’t work.”290  Because of this conclusion, Cuomo also figured that it is 
within his rights to ask the rhetorical question: “Are we asking government to make criminal 
what we believe to be sinful because we ourselves can’t stop committing the sin?”291  Though he 
did not offer an explicit answer, one can reasonably assume that Cuomo’s response would be a 
measured, though firm, “yes.”  
 Cuomo suggests at the conclusion of his remarks that Christian witness will be the most 
effective means of convincing others to act in accordance with Christian morality: even in terms 
of abortion.  Cuomo stated:  
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We can be fully Catholic; proudly, totally at ease with ourselves, a people in the world, 
transforming it, a light to this nation. Appealing to the best in our people not the worst. 
Persuading not coercing. Leading people to truth by love. And still, all the while, 
respecting and enjoying our unique pluralistic democracy. And we can do it even as 
politicians.292 
In the final analysis, Cuomo articulated a public philosophy that allowed for religious values to 
play a role in the actions of those in the public square, but did not go so far as to allow these 
values to outweigh a significant respect for religious pluralism.  Cuomo appropriated Murray’s 
jurisprudential principle as an overarching matrix by which he would govern.  What is more, 
Cuomo suggested that those who clamored for legislation making abortion illegal were, in effect, 
asking the state to legislate what they themselves could not convince their fellow citizens to 
acknowledge: the immorality of abortion. Cuomo constructed an approach to abortion that 
acknowledged the significance of the issue as one of public morality but fell back upon Murray’s 
thoughts regarding the problem of coercive law even in these matters. Cuomo construed the 
“consensus” as relying upon the majority opinion, or, at the least, as being beholden to a 
vociferous minority.  Nevertheless, Cuomo seemed hesitant to use his political opportunities to 
advocate for values he considered to be particularly religious (i.e. outlawing procured abortion).  
The irony of this situation is apparent: Cuomo argued that religious values have a place in the 
public conversation so long as they were intelligible to the society as a whole; yet, as a member 
of this same public conversation, he did not attempt to render the argument against abortion 
intelligible.  Instead, Cuomo invoked the aforementioned jurisprudential principle in order to 
argue that freedom benefited the overall common good in this case more than restriction.  On 
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Cuomo’s part, this was a matter of prudential political judgment.  The difficulty in accepting this 
judgment, however, stems from what Thomas Ferugson called “the myth of ‘democracy as 
religion’” which leads to a drift into purely secular ideology.293 Cuomo used an overly broad 
interpretation of consensus; as a consequence of this, one is left to wonder if the governor 
allowed advocated a position too satisfied with the legislative and judicial status quo and, 
because of this, failed to advocate for necessary restrictions.   
We now to turn to the final figure of this thesis, Henry Hyde, to provide a review of 
remarks he gave at Notre Dame in response to the comments of Governor Cuomo.  Delivered 
only months after Mario Cuomo’s speech at Notre Dame, Congressman Henry Hyde offered 
“Keeping God in the Closet: Some Thoughts on the Exorcism of Religious Values from Public 
Life,” at the Notre Dame School of Law.294  Hyde framed his speech as initially “discussing 
some of the major questions that have lately arisen touching the relations between politics and 
religion” and then “[concluding] with a few words about their meaning” for Catholics.295  Hyde 
began his remarks by noting that he did not intend to appeal for a nation ruled by explicitly 
religious precepts or the identification of one particular political party with the doctrinal 
positions of a particular religion.  Hyde did not even endorse a more muscular role for the church 
itself in the secular realm. The dominant presence of the Catholic Church – any church for that 
matter – in the political realm would not only be bad for society, but also for the church itself.  
Hyde explained that “when the church becomes too immediately identified with any particular 
partisan organization or agenda, it has lost a measure of its crucial capacity to be a sign of unity 
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in a broken world.”296  The reason for this, Hyde maintained, is grounded in the reality that a 
church which too closely identifies itself with one ideological position is “risking one of its 
essential roles” which is “that of being ground on which we can gather, not as partisans but as 
men and women of goodwill, to consider our differences in the context of our common 
humanity.”297  Acceptance of these premises, however, does not mean that religion ought to 
absent itself from discussions of political issues.   
 Hyde retrieved a broad range of examples that he believed buttressed his case against 
extreme secularists: he cited figures as diverse as John Winthrop and John Courtney Murray, 
calling the latter “the architect of the Vatican Council’s Declaration on Religious Liberty.”298  
Hyde aruged that:  
Religion and politics have thus always "mixed" in America, if what we are talking about 
is religious values and public policy. What the founders wisely understood was that 
religious institutions should not become unnecessarily entangled with the political 
process. From this understanding arose the twin principles of the First Amendment: No 
established church, and no state coercion over religious belief and practice, within the 
limits of maintaining the public order.299 
At the same time, Hyde maintained that “the constitutional separation of church and state is thus 
a question of institutional distinctiveness and integrity.  [This separation] was never intended to 
rule religiously-based values out.”300   
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 Until this point, Hyde and Cuomo proceeded along similar, though not perfectly aligned, 
paths of argumentation. Now, however, one sees a divergence because Hyde advocated for a 
more robust presentation of religious values in the public square than did Cuomo.  In some 
respects, Cuomo and Hyde disagreed not on the presence of religious values in the public square, 
but rather on the extent to which these same values ought to color the day-to-day political 
decisions of politicians.   Hyde decried the situation in the contemporary political climate where 
“any appeal to a religiously-based value to buttress an argument for this or that public policy 
option was thus a violation of the separation of church and state.”301  And yet:  
the application of this secular principle has been schizophrenic to say the least. The 
clergy were revered when they marched at Selma, joined anti-war sit-ins and helped 
boycott lettuce. They are reviled when they speak out against abortion. Anyone who 
studies these subjects soon gets familiar with the double standard.302 
Hyde construed the argument of Catholic political opposition to abortion as inherently protected 
by the Constitution, firmly rooted in Catholicism, and commensurate with other Catholic stances.  
 Hyde believed the best way to advance opposition to abortion was to not portray it as a 
particularly Catholic stance– but rather to present it as part of in the best tradition of American 
Constitutionalism wherein the right to life is defended.  Though Hyde recognized that opposition 
to abortion may proceed from religious values, the overarching metanarrative against abortion 
ought be rooted in the recognition of “a basic human right, the first civil right, enshrined in our 
nation’s birth certificate.”303  This supposition remains important when Catholics attempt to 
speak about issues such as abortion.  Though the “first causes,” may be religious, there is still 
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an obligation to do so in language and imagery that is accessible to a pluralistic audience, 
and not just to Catholics. In our democracy, the bishops clearly have the right to go 
farther, and to suggest what in their prudential judgments the public policies most likely 
to meet the test of their moral criteria would be. In Catholic theory, the bishops' 
prudential judgment is to be weighed seriously and respectfully; it is not weighted with 
the same gravity, however, as the bishops' teaching about the normative moral framework 
that should guide public policy.304 
Hyde advised politicians in a similar manner: “No more than any other citizen can we expect a 
president to put this conscience into the closet during his or her term of office.  We can expect 
that all presidents will hold to the distinction between religious institutions and religious values 
in framing their approach to these questions.”305  The real problematic for Hyde was not the 
influence of religious values in politics: he maintained that a non-believer had just as much right 
to use his or her values of non-belief to reach political conclusions as the believer.  What did, 
however, concern Hyde is that certain positions will be excluded from the public square 
precisely because they are usually associated with religious people.  This would result, he 
lamented, in casting out the “natural law tradition [which] provides a means for mediating 
religious values into the public area in a publicly accessible way.”306  In response to this 
possibility, Hyde flipped the question of religious values in secular society on its head and 
wondered aloud “whether the American experiment can survive the sterilization of the public 
arena that takes place when religiously based values are systematically ruled out of order in the 
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public discourse.”307  Before discussing the matter of abortion directly, Hyde made one more 
simple, yet trenchant point.  He noted the irony involved in the fact that for many years Catholics 
were excluded (or faced efforts to exclude them) due to their alleged rejection of pluralism.  And 
now, in current times, as a minority opinion of sorts, and the guarantor of plurality, they find 
their voice unwelcomed in the conversation.308   
 The foregoing explanation of the contours of Hyde’s argument has led us to the final 
paragraphs of his talk.  At the talk’s conclusion, he pivoted directly toward the matter of abortion 
and, in doing so, attempted to recalibrate the manner in which abortion is discussed.  Once again, 
he proceeded from a fundamentally Catholic worldview, yet attempted to do so in a manner that 
was not religiously idiosyncratic.  Hyde offers here, at least in one formulation, a public 
philosophy that informs public policy.   He first suggested that “we ought make use of the 
educative potential of public office to make clear that abortion is not, at bottom, a ‘Catholic 
issue,’ but rather a moral and civil rights issues, a humanitarian issue and a constitutional issue of 
the first importance.”309  Secondly, Hyde suggested that “we ought do everything in our power to 
make abortion a less immediate resort for the bearer of an unwanted child.”310 Hyde 
subsequently shifted his focus again to those who would cite the lack of a public consensus on 
the matter of abortion.  Hyde appeared to be directly addressing Cuomo here – and with him 
those who acknowledge abortion as a matter of public morality up for discussion.  He argued that 
“the duty of one who regards abortion as wrong is not to bemoan the absence of a consensus 
against abortion, but to help lead the effort to achieve one.”311  He continued by suggesting that 
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Catholics in elected office bore a moral burden “to clarify precisely what is at stake in the 
abortion controversy (and not only for the unborn child, but also for the moral-political health of 
the American experiment).”312  Hyde then offered a coda of sorts, lamenting: “Until we 
reestablish the legitimacy of an appeal to religiously based values in the conduct of the public 
debate over the public business, the abortion debate will remain a case of barely restrained ‘civil 
war’ carried on by other means.’”313   Hyde’s conclusion suggests that what ails the American 
political scene is a lack of political courage.  Professing opposition to abortion may not be 
politically expedient; basing such disagreement in religious values will be even more difficult.  
Hyde does not believe, however, that such difficulties should stand in the way of attempts to 
rearticulate religious values in manners intelligible to a pluralistic political scene.  An admittedly 
unanswered question in this consideration is whether or not Hyde fully appreciated the 
ambiguous situations faced by Christians in the earthly city.  Those sympathetic to Hyde’s 
broader positions regarding public policy would likely characterize him as grasping this 
ambiguity, while political opponents would disagree.  
 
Conclusion 
 There are several difficulties with the broader project that has been constructed herein: 
first and foremost, the literature is vast and the range of opinions varied.  Moreover, individuals 
examined within these pages remain products of their time.  Those examined – from Augustine 
to Hyde – also wrote during times of incredible historical fluidity.  Nevertheless, though the 
landscape of history be forever changing, to say nothing of the present, what has been attempted 
throughout this thesis is a form of exposition that looks favorably upon those viewpoints that can 
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appreciate nuance and the fundamental ambiguities involved in being a pilgrim member of the 
earthly city, still unsure as to the final ordering of one’s ultimate destiny – or the destiny of the 
state as a whole for that matter.314  Nowhere was this problem more present than in this past 
chapter, wherein I attempted to sketch summaries and analyses of three political thinkers who 
found themselves also engaged in the political life of the American nation, albeit at different 
points.  The challenges faced by Kennedy were different than those confronted by Cuomo and 
Hyde.  Kennedy needed to make a case that a Catholic could be trusted respect the founding 
political principles of a pluralistic nation. Kennedy thus spoke of particular challenges to 
Catholic allegiance, and in doing so, invoked larger questions of the place of religion belief in 
secular politics.  Years later, Cuomo and Hyde returned to this topic, yet did so in a different 
manner because the conversation had changed.  If Kennedy needed to answer the question of 
“how could a Catholic be an American?” then Cuomo and Hyde grappled with the same terms, 
considered in a different order: “How could an American still be Catholic?”  The conclusions of 
each of these figures answered that this would be possible. 
 Kennedy, for his part, attempted to outline an understanding of his religious faith that 
made it irrelevant to the needs of the state.  He did this in an attempt to assuage concerns that a 
Catholic President would, to one extent or another, govern by the particular moral principles of 
the Catholic Church.  It is no surprise, therefore, that Kennedy enumerates specific examples – 
education policy, relations with the Holy See – in which he advocated for positions that did not 
coincide with Catholic positions, as such.  Kennedy did, however, end his speech with a specific 
mention of God.  This highlights the fact that Kennedy took for granted the presence of God – 
and more generally, religiously based morality – in the public square; yet, he did not believe that 
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particular elements of one religion or another should be privileged in policy discussions because 
of the faith of the politician holding them.  In other words, Kennedy did not see any problem 
with religious values per se; rather, he thought that specifically going about matters of specific 
policy because of his Catholics values would offend the protection of religious pluralism 
enshrined in the First Amendment.  
 Mario Cuomo delivered his speech at Notre Dame when the inclusion of religious beliefs 
construed in the broadest sense could no longer be assumed as having a place in the public 
conservation.  In this way, his comments (as well as those of Henry Hyde) occupy a different era 
in American politics.  Cuomo thus needed to guard against allowing religious rhetoric to become 
entangled with his political positions for reasons of intelligibility.  What is more, since religious 
arguments had become less intelligible to the population at large, Cuomo bore the burden of 
balancing his religious commitments and his need to articulate intelligible arguments, all in a 
religiously plural society.  Cuomo attempted to achieve this balance advocating less legislative 
restriction, rather than more.  He made pluralism the operative value for his political career: an 
understandable decision.  Cuomo believed that such a tendency toward tolerance – even of 
policies that he himself believed to be problematic for Catholics – achieved two important goals, 
one religious and one political.  The first result of Cuomo’s position, his argument explained, 
protected the right of Catholics themselves to dissent.  Using abortion as an analogue, Cuomo 
reasoned that if the state did not make procured abortion illegal, then, in a corresponding way, 
Catholics could never be forced to procure an abortion.  Cuomo believed the second 
consequence of his position provided Catholics an entry point into political debates as political, 
not religious actors.  In other words, because the government does not do the moral work of 
religion, there would be incentive for Catholics (and others) to hone their arguments in such a 
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way as to be intelligible (and thus possibly convincing) to the existing pluralistic society.  In this 
way, Cuomo advocated for a public philosophy that admitted the place of religious values in the 
political conversation, so long as they moved beyond idiomatic religious expression.  Moreover, 
Cuomo conceived of a public philosophy which favored freedom precisely because it would 
allow religion to remain a part of an increasingly secular society. Cuomo, however, stopped short 
of suggesting that Catholic politicians themselves attempt to use their particular religious values 
to govern others.  This is the main point of disagreement between Cuomo and Henry Hyde, the 
latter of whom believed that Catholics in politics bore an obligation to render Catholic arguments 
intelligible and then act accordingly.  
 Henry Hyde’s speech at Notre Dame followed along many of the same themes as Mario 
Cuomo.   Hyde sought neither an increased identification between political parties and specific 
religious values, nor the imposition of religious (i.e., Catholic) values upon a pluralistic society.  
Instead, Hyde advocated for a reassertion of a public philosophy that admitted religious values to 
the broader public conversation.    Perhaps the most important part of Hyde’s argument was not 
the logic he outlined for speaking about procured abortions, but rather the recognition that the 
abandonment of the project of public philosophy harmed the overall health of the American 
political scene.  Hyde recognized that religious values are only serve as a starting point for 
conversation in pluralistic society and do not deserve to be considered as correct by the general 
public solely because these same ideas are religious.  In fact, those advocating against abortion 
found themselves at a natural disadvantage because their beliefs originated in religious 
reasoning.  Hyde allowed for religious values to be the basis for political positions, yet also 
suggested that these religious values ought be examined to see where they coincided with the 
founding principles of American constitutionalism.  In other words, while religious values served 
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as fundamental starting points for the arguments against the legality of procured abortion, they, 
in and of themselves, were not sufficient.  Consequently, Hyde commented that it was the 
obligation of Catholics in politics to find these places of convergence between religious and 
political values in such a way as to work toward a society that was both free and more virtuous.  
Instead of abandoning the inclusion of religious values in politics, Hyde believed (as do I, and 
with me, I would claim Murray) that what is really necessary is a recommitment to the use of 
publically intelligible philosophy that formulates its ideas in a manner intelligible to pluralist 
society. Failing that, at the very least, Catholics must be able to enter into dialogue and keep the 
conversation between secularity and Catholicism alive.  Indeed, what Murray claimed many 
years ago remains true: civility dies with the death of dialogue.315 
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Conclusion: Saint Patrick or the Fourth of July? 
 This thesis began by recalling Joseph Cardinal Bernardin’s hope that Catholic 
participation in the public square could usher in a “new moment” in American public policy 
debates.  Bernardin envisioned a situation in which Catholics would not only increase their own 
understanding of how their faith ought influence their participation in the earthly city – both as 
private citizens and as actors in the public square – but also influence those who did not 
necessarily characterize themselves as Catholics, or even more broadly, as possessing religious 
values.  Bernardin thought this achievement to be within reach if Catholics continued to engage 
the earthly city using the terms intelligible to the latter, while maintaining adherence to the 
values of the former.  I used Bernardin’s plea for a new moment to frame the proceedings of this 
work.  Chapter One engaged Augustine’s theology of the heavenly and earthly cities.  Augustine 
contributed to the task at hand by providing a theological justification for the unapologetic 
participation of Christians in the earthly city.  Moreover, Augustine constructed a political 
theology of sorts that recognized that when Christians did become engaged with those who did 
not hold similar values, compromise would sometimes be necessary. Augustine, however, wrote 
at a period when Christians were only beginning to involve themselves in the inner workings of 
the state and so to ask Augustine to solve the heady problems of how Catholics ought act when 
presiding over a pluralistic society is not possible. 
 Chapter Two examined the development of John Courtney Murray’s political theology 
articulated as a public philosophy.  My investigation primarily focused upon Murray’s treatment 
of Leo XIII, Gaudium et Spes, his more narrowly focused work, We Hold These Truths, and the 
memo drafted by Murray and sent to Cardinal Richard Cushing of Boston regarding 
contraception legislation in the early 1960s.  From here, I engaged the writings of Mary Segers 
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and Todd Whitmore that speculated as to how Murray would have considered the matter of 
legalized procured abortion.  All of these efforts sought to distill Murray’s public philosophy into 
an understandable form.  In the final analysis, I determined that Murray’s public philosophy 
based itself upon the principle that government should provide too much freedom rather than 
providing too little because freedom itself existed as a constitutive element of human dignity.  
His philosophy also includes the distinction between public and private morality, and the 
necessity of articulating policy arguments in a form intelligible to a religiously plural society. 
 The third and final chapter of this thesis engaged John Kennedy, Mario Cuomo, and 
Henry Hyde, all three of whom were Catholic politicians who spoke publically regarding the 
intersection of their religious beliefs and political duties. Each of these figures appropriated 
Augustine’s fundamental insight that the Christian bore an obligation to the betterment of the 
earthly city.  Kennedy, Cuomo, and Hyde also accepted the insights of GS that religious freedom 
had become normative in the modern age.  What is more, these three figures also configured 
their respective political views around finely held distinctions between public and private 
morality: they did not believe that all moral issues ought be the subject of legislation, nor that 
their personal religious preferences prescribed particular manners of solving matters of private 
morality.  The disagreements between these figures based themselves in the extent to which they 
believed their religious beliefs could and should influence their handling of matters that affected 
the whole of the earthly city.   
 My main purpose here has not been to judge the relative merits of the arguments of each 
of these figures, but rather to illuminate the manner in which each spoke and so craft a narrative 
which suggests that intelligibility is often neglected by those who wish to make religious 
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arguments in the public square.316 Each of these figures also provides for the reader a different 
strategy by which this intelligibility may be reached.  Kennedy explicitly minimized the 
influence that his Catholicism would influence his governance, while invoking the broader idea 
that he governed with knowledge of the existence of God.  Mario Cuomo believed that in order 
to protect the free exercise of religion, activities that contradicted specific religious sensibilities 
could not be outlawed, because this could allow religious people to be subsequently compelled to 
act against their own values.  Cuomo suggested that religious values possessed a place in the 
public square, but that it was not the duty or place of a politician serving the entirety of society to 
manifest such beliefs.  Finally, Henry Hyde suggested that Catholic politicians themselves render 
their own religious beliefs intelligibly to secular society in order to work for the improvement of 
that same society.   
None of these three figures are perfect: Kennedy claimed that he would not be guided by 
his personal religious beliefs if elected, but such a statement, in and of itself, made a statement 
regarding religious values.  Mario Cuomo understood consensus as simply being the majority 
opinion, and Hyde allowed a politician’s religious beliefs to hold too much sway in a religiously 
plural society.  Nevertheless, their perspectives all point the reader toward what a “new moment” 
in American Catholicism might resemble: a public philosophy, which, though originating in 
religious values, is articulated in a manner intelligible to more than those who hold religious 
principles.   
                                                
316 The term “intelligibility” raises a whole series of questions that will remain unanswered.  To 
engage questions of what makes arguments intelligible is a needed next step, albeit one for which 
there is not space. Nevertheless, I should like to propose that to call a political argument 
“intelligible” is to suggest that it is (1) able to be understood, (2) has the potential to persuade 
opponents, and (3) draws upon principles that are available to all those involved in a particular 
debate. 
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Near the conclusion of one of his articles reflecting upon Leo XIII, John Courtney 
Murray wrote: 
It would be pointless to argue the relative merits of the diverse applications - for instance, 
to argue the question, whether the constitutional law which governs 28 million Catholic 
Spaniards is "better law" than the constitutional law which governs 32 million Catholic 
Americans.  The argument would be pointless because the situations are 
incommensurable.  It would be like the famous drunken argument on the question, which 
is greater - St. Patrick or the Fourth of July? The more decisive thing is to know the right 
manner of argument for either of these legal decisions, for or against any legal decision 
affecting the relation of human law - that is, the state - to the order of religion.317 
Though I cannot be sure if Murray intended to be ironic by invoking an old joke regarding Saint 
Patrick and the Fourth of July, the poignancy of its meaning still obtains.  The first figure is 
grounded in religious meaning yet has become emblematic of ethnic pride.  Independence Day, a 
thoroughly secular holiday, is wrapped in that sort of ritual usually reserved for religious 
observances, replete with the burgeoning virtue of “patriotism.”  I bring this up at the conclusion 
of this thesis to illustrate what Augustine first intuited: religious belief and politics will become 
inevitably entwined since they both cut to the very heart of human experience: the expression of 
identity.  What is more, just as a debate regarding the advisability of one form of constitutional 
government or another is based not necessarily in general principles, but rather in the particular 
situation of one nation or another, so too are Catholic approaches to matters of public morality in 
a pluralistic society largely beholden to related political and societal factors.  This is not to say, 
of course, that in order to be a Catholic in a pluralistic society one must change one’s beliefs in 
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accord with the prevailing political winds, but it does suggest that the advisability of one 
approach or another to matters of public morality are subject to political concerns as well as 
religious ones. 
In order to achieve, as Cardinal Bernardin called it, a “new moment” for Catholic 
participation in the public square, it will be necessary to engage matters of public morality with 
the best resources of the Catholic intellectual tradition.  In any such configuration, Augustine’s 
theology of the relationship between the heavenly and earthly cities, as well as John Courtney 
Murray’s public philosophy will prove vital to the task.  Moreover, any such engagement with 
issues as divisive as abortion will also require a commitment to dialogue and discussion: for 
Catholics, such a commitment must be underlined not only be a tone of engagement, but also 
with efforts to render their vocabulary intelligible to non-believers of all stripes.  
In the final analysis, this “new moment” will not be reached by repeating the political 
rhetoric of Kennedy, Cuomo, or Hyde (or even a combination of therein).  Rather, the lessons of 
each of these figures must be appropriated anew.  In other words, American Catholics will only 
be able to remain proponents of the faith of Patrick if they are also able to participate in the local 
Fourth of July parade.   
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